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INTRODUCTION: The Polycentric Heritage of the Enlightenment

What is the Enlightenment? Where was the Enlightenment? Immanuel Kant (1720-1840)
famously posed the former question in 1784 with “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?”
(“Answer the Question: What is Enlightenment?”), and it was echoed by Michel Foucault (19261984) in his 1984 essay, “Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?”1 The latter question, however, appeared
much more self-evident. Since the emergence of Enlightenment historiography in the twentieth
century, the West proclaimed the term as a unique product of its intellectual achievement and a
gift to the rest of the world’s progress towards rationality, civil consciousness, and modernity.2
Yet, recent scholars of European intellectual history have started to challenge this Eurocentric
notion. Rather than perceiving the Enlightenment as a self-contained movement that matured in
isolation within a handful of European states, historians are looking to situate the Enlightenment
in context of globalization during the early modern period. This has given rise to a new field of
inquiry known as the “Global Enlightenment.”
After Edward Saïd’s monumental study on Orientalism appeared in 1978, Western
academics can scarcely find another satisfying way of interpreting the East-West relationship
besides one rooted in malicious misrepresentation and subjugation. In this postcolonial framework,
the West stands as the invasive, dominant, and masculine force, while the East is the perpetual

Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in Sources of the Western Tradition, Volume II, Marvin Perry, et. al.,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), 56-57; Michel Foucault, « Qu’est-ce que les Lumières ? » Dits et
Ecrits, tome IV, (1984), 562-578.
2
For landmark Enlightenment scholarship that relates it as a uniquely European phenomenon, see: Ernst Cassirer,
The Philosophy of the Enlightenment: Updated Edition. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, originally
published in 1932); Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York: Knopf, 1966); Robert
Darnton, The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); J.G.A.
Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999-2011); Roy Porter, The
Creation of the Modern World: The Untold Story of the British Enlightenment. (New York: Norton, 2000). For
studies on Enlightenment historiography, see: J. G. A. Pocock, “Historiography and Enlightenment: A View of
Their History.” Modern Intellectual History 5, no. 1 (2008): 83–96. Annelien de Dijn, “The Politics of
Enlightenment: From Peter Gay to Jonathan Israel.” The Historical Journal 55, no. 3 (2012): 785–805; Jonathan
Israel, “J. G. A. Pocock and the ‘Language of Enlightenment’ in His Barbarism and Religion,” Journal of the
History of Ideas 77, no. 1 (01, 2016): 107-127.
1
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“Other” who completes the dichotomy. The subjugated Orient therefore becomes a site of
projection for Europe’s repressed fears and desires––a mirror image that consolidated European
strength and identity. Furthermore, Saïd emphasizes the “sheer knitted together strength of
Orientalist discourse” that reiterates the uneven power dynamic between East and West, thus
“overriding the possibility that a more independent, or more skeptical, thinker might have had
different views on the matter.”3 Consequently, post-Saïd historians balk at the danger of replicating
Orientalist discourse when examining cross-cultural encounters in a way that does not affirm the
East’s quintessential nature as a victimized “mirage” or an “Other” to the West.4
But in fact, rethinking Enlightenment historiography can provide an entryway to
dismantling this Orientalist discourse. Saïd points out how the West saw the East as “the source of
its civilizations and languages” and its biggest “cultural contestant,” implying that the East loomed
as an imposing yet inscrutable figure in Europe’s imagination even before its ascendency into
colonial power. 5 This presents Asia as an important subject of investigation for the Global
Enlightenment, which may shed light on an East-West dynamic that precedes the postcolonial
paradigm. The project of Global Enlightenment, by considering Asia as a potential contributor to
a piece of intellectual heritage that in many ways sanctioned the imperial confidence of the
nineteenth century, can reset the uneven power structure established by Oriental discourse and
uproot Europe’s monopoly over a set of intellectual traditions so embedded in today’s
sociopolitical vocabulary.

3

Edward Saïd, Orientalism, (New York: Penguin Random House, 1979), 6-7.
Stefan Gaarsmand Jacobsen, “Chinese Influences or Images? Fluctuating Histories of How Enlightenment Europe
Read China.” Journal of World History 24, no. 3 (2013): 638-647; J. J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The
Encounter Between Asian and Western Thought, (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 1997), 14.
5
Saïd, 1.
4
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Indeed, many historians of the Global Enlightenment have contributed to the field by
reevaluating the role of Asia. 6 However, their models of interpretation diverge, and some are less
satisfying than others. Sebastian Conrad’s abundantly cited study on the Global Enlightenment
proposes a model of exportation. Conrad maintains that, while Enlightenment ideals originated
from Europe, the significance and nuance they presently possess were the collective work of
“historical actors around the world…who invoke the term, and what they saw as its most important
claims, for their own specific purposes.”7 To illustrate, Conrad points out how thinkers of Meiji
Japan (1868-1912) and the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) appropriated certain Enlightenment
ideals such as “civilization” and “humanity” to facilitate periods of critical transition in their
respective nations.8 This allowed the Enlightenment to evolve and accumulate meaning even after
the movement ended in Europe. Conrad frames his thesis as an attempt to subvert the Eurocentric
historiography that considers the Enlightenment to have ended around 1800, because such a
chronology “erases the vibrant and heated contestations of ‘Enlightenment’ in the rest of the world,
particularly in Asia.”9 To stress his point, Conrad cites the rhapsodizing words of a Meiji reformer:
“Whenever we open our mouths, it is to speak of ‘enlightenment.’” 10 It is not difficult to spot the
irony and the troubling implication within this model of exportation. Although it suggests that

For the body of work consulted on Enlightenment and Asia, see: Virgile Pinot, La Chine et la formation de l’esprit
philosophique en France 1640-1740, (Genève: Slatkine Reprints, 1971); Basil Guy, The French Image of China
before and After Voltaire (Genéve: Institut et musée Voltaire, 1963); David E. Mungello, Leibnitz and
Confucianism: the Search for Accord (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977); John M. Hobsen, The Eastern
Origins of Western Civilization, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); David Martin Jones, The Image of
China in Western Social and Political Thought, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 14-36; Madeline Dobie, Trading
Places: Colonization and Slavery in Eighteenth-Century French Culture, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010);
Jürgen Osterhammel, Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment’s Encounter with Asia, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2018); Alexander Statman, "The First Global Turn: Chinese Contributions to Enlightenment
World History," Journal of World History 30, no. 3 (2019): 363-392.
7
Sebastian Conrad, “Enlightenment in Global History: A Historiographical Critique,” The American Historical
Review 117, no. 4 (2012), 1001.
8
Conrad, 1001-2, 1014.
9
Conrad, 1015.
10
Conrad, 1015; cited in Albert M. Craig, Civilization and Enlightenment: The Early Thought of Fukuzawa Yukichi
(Cambridge, Mass., 2009), 149.
6
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global actors have popularized and redefined Enlightenment legacy, the movement’s purely
European origin remains unquestioned and even aggrandized as an invaluable intellectual heritage
that helped to inspire modernity in various non-European cultures.11 Ultimately, despite his claim
to subvert Eurocentrism, Conrad’s thesis dangerously feeds into the Orientalist framework that
endows the West with intellectual superiority and originality.
Directly opposing Conrad is the model of importation, which proposes that foreign
philosophies played a part in the formation of the intellectual landscape of early modern Europe.
In her study, “Could David Hume Have Known about Buddhism?” Alison Gopnik attempts at
presenting Buddhism as a possible source of inspiration for Hume’s metaphysics and skepticism,
citing his contact with Jesuit missionaries who extensively studied Buddhism in Siam and Tibet
and brought these ideas back to Europe. Although Hume may not have directly invoked Buddhism
in his writings, Gopnik argues that the network of intellectual influence and engagement is not
limited to explicit discourse between philosophers, because “psychologically, people can be
influenced by ideas, even when they themselves forget the source of those ideas.” 12 Gopnik’s
thesis illuminates just how intricate and vibrant the process of transnational intellectual exchange
could be during early Enlightenment, in which the missionaries played an integral role in
broadening the ideological scope of the later philosophes. 13 More importantly, this potential
connection between Hume and Buddhism shows that non-European philosophies, especially those
imported from the Far East, might have participated and even inspired Enlightenment
conversations. Gopnik’s model, though innovative, is overly speculative. Her argument for the

11

Antoine Lilti, L'héritage Des Lumières: Ambivalences De La Modernité, (Paris: Gallimard, 2019), 57-58.
Alison Gopnik, "Could David Hume Have Known about Buddhism?: Charles François Dolu, the Royal College of
La Flèche, and the Global Jesuit Intellectual Network." Hume Studies 35 (2009). 6-7.
13
Gopnik, 22.
12
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possibility of engagement and inspiration between thinkers on a purely “psychological” level
suggests that it is difficult to find concreate evidence for such a process.
A more prevalent method of examining the Global Enlightenment is through the model of
appropriation. While this approach also advocates for the prominent presence of Asian intellectual
traditions in Enlightenment spaces, it focuses on how European thinkers purposefully appropriated
and distorted these ideas to advance their own intellectual agenda, lacking in any genuine interest
to understand their cultural nuances. Although the Enlightenment appeared to profess an interest
and even admiration for certain foreign cultures, its attempt to engage with them was ultimately
superficial, one-sided, and grounded in misunderstandings. This model gives a critical and rather
pessimistic view on the treatment of Asian presence in early modern European intellectual history.
It declares that, much like the explosion of Orientalist trends such as “chinoiserie” in cultural
spaces, Europe’s interest in Eastern philosophies was simply another manifestation of this shallow
and fleeting craze masquerading as cosmopolitan spirit. 14
Historians who apply the model of appropriation when evaluating Enlightenment’s
encounter with Asia often stop at drawing a critical conclusion about the hopeless Eurocentric ego
of the age. Consequently, they fall short of recognizing and articulating the intellectual power that
imported cultures did exert in Europe, and how it was precisely made possible through acts of
appropriation by local thinkers. The notion of appropriation tends to evoke the postcolonial
understanding of East-West dynamics; that is, a one-directional act of gross misrepresentation that
consolidated European identity or a fetishization that contributed no valuable progress towards

Edwin J. Van Kley, “Europe’s ‘Discovery’ of China and the Writing of World History.” The American Historical
Review 76, no. 2 (1971): 358–85; Arnold H. Rowbotham, “La Mothe Le Vayer’s Vertu Des Payens and EighteenthCentury Cosmopolitanism.” Modern Language Notes 53, no. 1 (1938), 14.
14
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cross-cultural understanding. There is, however, the danger of reductionism in applying this model
regardless of the historical or cultural contexts in which the act of appropriation took place.
Studies that approach the development of certain political and artistic movements from a
transnational lens have proposed the possibility of a productive form of appropriation. Xiaomei
Chen, in her influential work on the phenomenon of Occidentalism in Maoist China, argues that
appropriation and the imagining of an “Other” could effectively localize imported ideologies and
use them to produce a “politically liberating” discourse that undermines the existing power
structure.15 Hence, appropriation or “misunderstanding” is not inherently problematic and may
even be a natural process of cross-cultural exchange, since not all acts of appropriation are
necessarily an act of power or an assertion of cultural hegemony. As Chen astutely observes: “it is
an essentialist claim to assume that the West is by nature or definition monolithically imperialistic,
and therefore has subjugated all non-Western cultures throughout all historical periods.” 16
Chen’s critique against essentialism can help us understand cross-cultural interactions
before the age of colonialism in a new light. Considering the Enlightenment as an intellectual
revolution against numerous religious, political, and cultural structures in early modern Europe, it
may serve our interest to reexamine how appropriation fit into the Enlightenment and even became
an indispensable aspect of its development. As my study will show, it is no coincidence that some
of the most radical thinkers of the French Enlightenment, such as Pierre Bayle and Voltaire, were
also self-proclaimed enthusiasts of Confucian China. In L’héritage des Lumières, Antoine Lilti
notably makes an attempt to reconcile the failings of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism with the

15

Xiaomei Chen, Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China. (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995), 25. Chen is not the only scholar who argues for the productive potential of cultural
misrepresentation, especially between Europe and China, that breaks away from the postcolonial framework. See,
for example, Lydia H. Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity, China
1919-193, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Marie-Paule Ha, Figuring the East: Segalen, Malreaux,
Duras, and Barthes, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 95-117.
16
Chen, 12.
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rising interest in writing and studying world history. Using Voltaire’s positive and extensive
discussion of China and India in Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations, Lilti argues that,
although these cultures were only relevant to Voltaire in how they could serve Europe’s need be
to be liberated from religious fanaticism, the sincerity of the philosophe’s interest and effort to
look beyond Europe to inform his anti-cleric perspective remains valid, regardless of his ultimate
intention. 17 That is to say, if we continue to dismiss Enlightenment’s interest in Eastern
philosophies on the grounds of misrepresentation, the “politically liberating” effect that they
produced in Europe will also be lost, thus ironically perpetuating the East-West power imbalance
that emerged in the nineteenth century.
Using Lilti’s observation as a point of departure, I hope to fill the gap left by scholars too
entrapped by the postcolonial paradigm to consider how appropriation functioned differently, and
even productively, in eighteenth-century Europe. I will examine the reception of Confucian
thoughts, and more broadly, the cultures and image Confucian China, in France to uncover the
polycentric origin of the Enlightenment heritage. In direct opposition to Conrad’s model of
exportation, which positions Europe as the disseminator of ideologies and Asia as the receiver who
appropriated them to achieve progress for themselves in the nineteenth century, I argue that
Enlightenment Europe itself had been a junction, and even a product, of ideological importation
and reproduction. Confucianism, which was inseparable from the image of China since the Jesuits
first brought the philosophy to Europe and later found its way into the vocabulary of monumental
French thinkers such as Pierre Bayle and Voltaire, will serve as a case study of how an imported
philosophy addressed eighteenth-century France, by necessity, through the reinterpretation of local
intellectuals. This understanding of the Global Enlightenment builds upon the model of

17

Lilti, 25.
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appropriation by recognizing and centering the Eurocentrism that fueled each attempt at engaging
foreign cultures, while integrating the model of importation to provide a more careful
consideration of how these cultures, though misrepresented, shaped Enlightenment narrative and
served as a vehicle for some of its most formidable players to develop and articulate their ideas.
In sum, it is imperative to recognize the polycentric origins of the Enlightenment as a
reason that makes it a subject of global studies. True, the fact that Enlightenment ideals continued
to circulate and proliferate around the world after the end of eighteenth century elevated its
relevance beyond European history; but to truly revise the Eurocentric historiography, we must
not treat the Enlightenment as the beginning of cross-cultural encounters, but a product shaped by
the century-long globalization that started in the early modern period. In other words, the
Enlightenment was not just an idea to be consumed by non-European actors but was itself a
consumer of imported ideologies in a complex network of intellectual exchange.
The following study is divided into two chapters. The first examines the conception of the
image of Confucian China in the seventeenth century under Jesuit missionaries working in the
Chinese imperial court. These missionaries, who served as intellectual intermediaries between
Europe and Asia and therefore a key contributor to the transnational fertilization of ideas over the
next century, constructed a Christianized interpretation of Confucianism to seek support for their
conversion mission while also attempting to bolster the relevancy of religious consciousness in
Europe. This section focuses on Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, a Jesuit translation of Confucian
classics published in France in 1687. It was the work that first provided Europe with access to
Confucian writings and exerted a formative influence over China’s image in European imagination
in the next century.18 The second chapter explores how the Christianized reading of Confucianism

Rowbotham, “Impact of Confucianism,” 227; Kund Lundbaek, “The Image of Neo-Confucianism in Confucius
Sinarum Philosophus,” Journal of the History of Ideas 44, no. 1 (1983), 19.
18
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presented in Confucius Sinarum Philosophus transformed under the hands of later Enlightenment
thinkers, who conjured a vastly different understanding of Confucian China to complement their
political and intellectual agenda. Although these thinkers failed to approach Confucianism with a
sincere desire to understand it, their reinterpretations enabled this imported philosophy to resonate
within the local context and be incorporated into Enlightenment conversations.

Context: The Conception of the First Latin Translation of Confucian Classics
Given the centrality of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus to the first half of this study, it is
necessary to briefly contextualize this translation project, its Chinese source material, and the
Jesuit mission to China that conceived it. The attempt to learn and translate the Confucian canon
started in the late sixteenth century with a pair of Italian Jesuits, Michele Ruggieri (1543-1607)
and Mateo Ricci (1552-1610), soon after the first group of missionaries arrived at China in 1579.19
While the project was partly driven by the need to learn the Chinese language and assimilate into
the indigenous culture to facilitate the conversion mission, it was also politically motivated. The
Jesuits understood that, in order to establish themselves among the Chinese literati and court
officials and spread Christian propaganda from the top-down, knowledge of Confucianism was
imperative, since it was the state ideology of China and the philosophy of the elites. 20 The
collective efforts of Ruggieri and Ricci produced a Latin translation of a collection of Confucian
texts known as the Four Books (四书 Sishu), and the manuscript was passed down onto successive
generation of Jesuits in China. 21

19

Brockey, 4; Thierry Meynard, Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (1687): The First Translation of the Confucian
Classics, (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 2011), 3-27.
20
Brockey, 8.
21
David Mungello, 253.
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In Confucian traditions, the Four Books are comprised of the following texts: Daxue (大
学, The Great Learning), Zhongyong (中庸, The Doctrine of the Mean), Lunyu (论语, The
Analects), and Mengzi (孟子, Mencius). The first three supposedly recorded the teachings of
Kongzi, or Confucius (551 BCE – 479 BCE), on subjects ranging from rituals, human relations,
social obligations, the virtue of governance, and more. Together with the Five Classics (五经,
Wujing), the Four Books make up a core component of Confucian canon and were a mandated
subject of study for the educated elites since the tenth century in China, from court officials to
Emperors. The Four Books were also a source of rich scholarly engagement through the tradition
of commentary-writing. Students of Confucius rarely approach ancient texts such as the Four
Books and the Five Classics alone, but rather with the help of interlinear commentaries by some
later scholar that explained ambiguous terms and speculated on the intended moral lessons.
Confucian commentarial tradition emerged around the time of Han Dynasty (202 BCE – 220 CE),
when the philosophy was adopted as a part of the state ideology. Since then, Confucian scholars
up until the modern day produced a rich corpus of commentaries on the canon that offered
diverging interpretations, posed questions, and entered dialogues with each other. The most
influential commentaries could even be inaugurated into a part of the canon. Thus, the
commentaries attested to the dynamic and evolving nature of the philosophy.22 As my study will
show, while the Jesuits meticulously studied and deployed various editions of Confucian

22

Daniel K. Gardner, "Confucian Commentary and Chinese Intellectual History," The Journal of Asian Studies 57,
no. 2 (1998), 397-422; for additional scholarship on Confucian commentarial traditions, see: John B. Henderson,
Scripture, Canon and Comentary: A Comparison of Confucius and Western Exegis, (Princeton University Press,
2014, originally published in 1991); Gardner, Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2003); Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Whose Confucius? Which Analects?” in Confucius and Analects: New Essays, ed.
Bryan W. Van Norden, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 119-130; John Makeham, Transmitters and
Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2003); Thierry Meynard, The Jesuit Reading of Confucius: The First Complete Translation of the Lunyu (1687)
Published in the West (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 16-71.
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commentaries in their translation, the commentarial tradition was either ignored or remained
unknown to the thinkers in Europe, who all too gladly represented Confucianism as timeless and
perfected wisdom passed down from the legendary Chinese sage.
Ruggieri and Ricci’s translation was eventually edited by Father Prospero Intorcetta (16261696) and then published in 1662 in China under the name Sapientia Sinica (Chinese Wisdom) as
an instruction manual for new missionaries. It was around this time that certain voices emerged
within the Catholic Church to question the theological integrity of Confucianism, since it mandated
many rituals, such as ancestral worship, that appeared superstitious and idolatrous.23 These debates
evolved into what came to be known as the Chinese Rites Controversy, which persisted for decades
between Europe and the missionaries abroad. 24 During the Rites Controversy, the opponents of
Confucianism cited Intorcetta’s translation to prove the idolatrous nature of the philosophy. In
response, Intorcetta assembled a group of Jesuits to produce a revised translation of the Four Books
with a new and distinct objective in mind: to prove the congruence between Confucianism and
Christianity and thus the Chinese population’s potential to receive conversion, since the Jesuits
recognized that it would be impossible for the locals to abandon their Confucian heritage. 25 Thus,
the intended audience of this new translation was no longer limited to the Jesuits in China, but also
the readers, specifically the elite members of the Catholic Church, back in Europe. A notable
member of Intorcetta’s team was the Flemish Jesuit Philippe Couplet (1623-1693), who would
later organize the final publication of Confucian Sinarum Philosophus and serve as a key
ambassador between the French state and the mission in China.

23

Meynard, CSP, 7-8.
For more studies on the Chinese Rites Controversy, see: Guy, 23-55; Yu Liu, “Behind the Façade of the Rites
Controversy: the Intriguing Contrast of Chinese and European Theism,” The Journal of Religious Studies, 44, no. 1
(2020): 3-26.
25
Meynard, CSP, 10.
24
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For over a decade, the translation project was disrupted and delayed for different reasons,
until Couplet returned to Rome in 1680 to prepare the translated manuscripts of the Four Books
for publication. Within a few years, Couplet managed to secure the patronage of the French
monarch, King Louis XIV (1638-1715), for the mission in China. At the time, Louis XIV was the
most powerful supporter of the Catholic Church in Europe. His impending revocation of the Edict
of Nantes, which would outlaw the practice of Protestantism in France, further solidified his image
as the worthies and likeliest ally for the Jesuits. With Louis XIV’s financial and political support,
Rome would not be able to contest the publication of the manuscripts despite the unsettled nature
of the Chinese Rites Controversy. Thus, with Couplet’s coordination, Confucius Sinarum
Philosophus, sive Scientia Sinensisi (Confuicius, the Philosopher of China, or the Chinese
Learning) appeared before the French public in 1687. The following chapter will show how a
consolidated image of the Chinese Sage emerged out of this volume, and how the translation
produced a Christianized interpretation of Confucian classics that the Jesuits hoped to mobilize for
their political interests in Europe.
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CHAPTER I. The Christian Interpretation: Confucius Sinarum Philosophus 26
Six months after the publication of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (hereafter CSP), a book
review by one Pierre Régis (1632 - 1707) appeared in Le Journal des Sçavants in January 1688.
As a Cartesian scholar with a keen interest in theology, Régis’ review of CSP was noteworthy not
only as one of the earliest public reactions towards Confucianism in France, but also in how it
encapsulated the key takeaways of a Christian reading of Confucianism that the Jesuits hoped to
evoke with their translation and commentaries on the Four Books.
A summary on each of the Four Books and the Five Classics constituted the main body of
Régis’ review. In his opening paragraphs, Régis affirmed the legitimacy of the Jesuit’s
ethnographic and scholarly pursuits in the Chinese empire despite possible linguistic challenges. 27
He proceeded to highlight the spiritual achievement of their mission in introducing Christian
verities to the Chinese, which they apparently not only accepted with openness and trust, but also
regarded as “des consequences qui se déduisaient de leurs principes, et qui étaient confirmées par
l’autorité de leurs propres Philosophes.” 28 Régis’ assessment of the conversion efforts in China
had vastly overstated the Jesuits’ success in this undertaking. As to the claim that Christian
principles would have been readily approved by the Chinese philosophers, Régis’ review would

26

I would like to acknowledge that in writing this chapter, I am hugely indebted to the works of Professor Thierry
Meynard, JS. His English translations of Daxue and Lunyu in CSP, published in 2011 and 2015 respectively, and his
comprehensive introduction to intellectual background of Jesuits’ translation project, served as foundational
resources in the building of my argument.
27
For scholarship on the Jesuit missionaries in China, see: Guy, 56-105; Arnold H. Rowbotham, Missionary and
Mandarin: The Jesuits at the Court of China, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1942); David
E. Mungello, Curious Land: Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins of Sinology, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1989); Lydia H. Liu ed. Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations, (Duke
University Press, 1999); Liam Matthew Brockey, Journey to the East: The Jesuit Mission to China, 1579-1724,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Nicolas Standaert, “Jesuits in China,” In The Cambridge Companion
to the Jesuits, ed, Thomas Worcester, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 169–85; Meynard, CSP, 327.
28
Pierre Régis, “Compte rendu du Confucius Sinarum Philosophus,” Journal des savants (janvier, 1688), 100.
Translation: “…results naturally deduced from their (the Chinese people’s) principles and were confirmed by the
authority of their own philosophers.”

Rachel Yang

14

demonstrate that it existed above all else in the imagination of the Jesuits and their faithful readers
in Europe.
After introducing each of the Four Books and the Five Classics in compact paragraphs,
Régis commented: “Il faudrait employer trop de discours pour parcourir toutes les maximes de
Morale, qui sont renfermées dans les trois livres de Confucius. Nous nous contenterons de les
proposer seulement en abrégé dans la description qu’il fait lui même de la Charité.” 29 Such a
conclusion reveals much about the treatment Confucianism received under a Christian
interpretation. The cultural and ideological nuance of the philosophy were sacrificed in favor of a
familiar and abridged presentation to European readers. For Régis, the essence of Confucianism
boiled down to the single concept of Charity, which conveniently aligned with one of the most
valued Christian virtues. After proposing the compatibility between Christianity and Confucianism
on the matter of charity, Régis incorporated a lengthy, word-for-word French translation of a
passage he cited from CSP, in which Confucius defined “Charity” as a state of “perfect piety”
achieved through constant self-improvement founded on reason and abandonment of self-interest,
which would allow humanity to attain a state of perfect harmony and universal love as if it was a
single entity.
This citation corresponds to a line from passage 6.28 of Lunyu. Originally a two-sentence
remark from Confucius, it appeared before Régis as a meandering lecture on piety, the unity of
men, and selfless love, all of which are words nowhere to be found in the classical Lunyu text.
While I will offer a closer analysis on the translation of this passage later in this chapter, I introduce
it here to point out how the liberally interpretive nature of CSP’s translation influenced subsequent
European engagement with Chinese philosophy. The mixture of paraphrasing, synthesizing, and

Régis, 103; Translation: “Much discourse is needed to cover all the moral maxims, which are enclosed in the three
books of Confucius. We will be content to only propose in abridgement that he (Confucius?) also practiced charity.”
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(de)contextualizing implemented by the Jesuits in translating this passage produced a heavily
Christianized interpretation of Confucius’ words, which the French readers, such as Régis, took
for granted since they had no means of accessing and cross-referencing the Chinese sources. For
instance, towards the end of Régis’ citation, Confucius supposedly said: “Ne vouloir pas qu’il leur
arrive ce que nous ne voulons pas qu’il ous arrive à nous-mêmes.” This was in fact a phrase from
a different conversation in Book 12 of Lunyu that the Jesuits inserted into Book 6.30 Conveniently
for Régis, the citation ended with a statement that bore strong resemblance with the Christian
Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” This created a perfect leadup to his observation in the following paragraph: “Je ne vois pas qu’au motif près, la charité des
Chinois soit differente de celle des Chretiens,” that God had bestowed in these infidels the same
capacity for grace and enlightenment as Christians. 31 Régis was correct, however, in noting the
centrality of “charity” in Confucian texts. It is only that using “charity” as a translation captured
but a small facet of the Chinese term which, until this day, lacked a perfect equivalent in Western
languages, that is the concept of Ren (仁). Among the multitude of French words that could
indicate Ren under different contexts, Régis chose a passage that interpreted Ren as charity in
attempt to amplify the appeal of this philosopher to European readers.
Régis, however, did not understand how this Lunyu passage was largely a product of
Jesuit’s artful maneuvering; he was simply delighted to see the universality of Christian principles
manifested in a civilization as antiquated and prosperous as China, and eagerly proclaimed to his
French readership this great discovery of the Jesuits. His review foretold the total severance of
European thinkers’ version of Confucianism from its cultural context. Through translation, the

Régis, 104; Translation: “Do not wish upon others what we do not wish upon ourselves.” The Chinese text is: “己
所不欲，勿施于人” (12.1)
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Régis, 104; Translation: “I see no reason that the charity of the Chinese would be different than that of the
Christians.”
30

Rachel Yang

16

Jesuits acted as powerful intellectual intermediaries between France and China, setting up CSP as
the work that shaped European understanding of Chinese thoughts over the next century. 32 But
before we can analyze the legacy of CSP, we must first investigate what the Jesuits hoped to
accomplish with it, with particular attention to their religious and political motives. This chapter
begins with a close reading of CSP, focusing on its representation of the Confucian virtue Ren,
the Jesuits’ methods in constructing a consistent Christian narrative, and the political stake of CSP
regarding the status quo of Christianity in Europe. It then turns to a French translation of the Four
Books, Lettres sur la morale de Confucius (1688), based on CSP. Together, these texts illustrate
how, since their earliest appearance in France, translation distorted Confucian texts to repurpose
them for French religious and political needs.
In scrutinizing instances of textual manipulation or misrepresentation of Confucian texts
in translated works, my objective is not to prove the presence of a proto-orientalist approach or to
critique the inevitable Eurocentrism in this process of intellectual exchange between France and
China; instead, it is to uncover the global origin of the Enlightenment. The Jesuit translators
transformed Confucianism into a vessel of European intellectual discourse, enabling Confucian
ideas to transcend the culture-specific application they were bound to and subsequently find
relevance in seventeenth-century Europe. They became a malleable tool for Western thinkers to
engage with the weightiest moral and intellectual problems of their time. To understand the story
from the beginning, this chapter examines the aspects of Confucianism that most appealed to
theologically minded readers such as Régis, who inhabited a space that was physically and
epistemologically segregated from classical China, and considers to what extent these readers’
response was a product of the “repackaging” or ideological adaptation spearheaded by the Jesuits.

Arnold H. Rowbotham, “The Impact of Confucianism on Seventeenth Century Europe,” The Far Eastern
Quarterly 4, no. 3 (1945), 227; Clarke, 40.
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1.1 Lunyu and Christianity
Confucius Sinarum Philosophus opened with a letter from Philippe Couplet addressed to
King Louis IV, where Couplet established, firmly and immediately, the religious connotations of
Confucianism. In an earnest pitch for the moral integrity of Confucius despite his apparent
paganism, Couplet declared in this letter: “Since truly this very wise Philosopher has recognized,
by the light of nature and reason alone, that men should revere religion above all things, he
conducted his teaching and training towards the single goal that mortals should arrange all their
lives according to the laws and precepts of the supreme divine will.” 33 In stating that Confucius’
piety rested on “nature and reason,” Couplet acknowledged that the Chinese philosopher only
practiced “natural theology” and thus did not reach full enlightenment due to the lack of revelation;
still, Couplet tried to present Confucius as possessing perfect potential to receive conversion, since
he apparently already recognized the deference to a “supreme divine” as the basis of his moral
teachings.34
Couplet’s claim that a “religion,” at least in a Western monotheistic sense, existed in
Confucianism was problematic. While the idea of a Heaven (tian 天) and deferring to Heaven’s
Mandate (tian ming 天命) were indeed important to Confucianism, Confucian scholars had offered
a multitude of ways to understand Heaven and its relationship with men, signifying that the
conception of Heaven was malleable at best, and ambiguous at worst. 35 What is certain is that the
classical texts by no means provide a systematic doctrine for the conceptualization and worship of
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a single divine entity. Such ambiguity is prominent in seventeenth century Neo-Confucian
scholarship due to the highly influential text by Song Dynasty intellectual Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130 1200), Collected Commentaries of the Four Books (Sishu Jizhu 四书集注), whose metaphysical
interpretation of Heaven that the Jesuits worked hard to suppress in their translation. 36
In Zhu Xi’s commentary, he proposed a unique concept, “li” (理), or “principle,” and
discussed its role in shaping morality and human nature. Neo-Confucianism adopted Zhu Xi’s liprinciple as a part its orthodoxy, defining it as a priori moral knowledge endowed by Heaven and
innate to every human being. 37 This interpretation is consistent with Zhu Xi’s idea that li-principle
is a manifestation of Heaven (tianjili 天即理). According to Zhu Xi, Heaven’s Mandate is
implicated in each person’s nature (xing 性) since birth. To obey Heaven, therefore, is to
understand, cultivate, and follow one’s own nature. In Zhu Xi’s words: “If each person follows
what is natural to this nature, he will always take the proper path in his day-to-day affairs. It is this
that we call ‘the Way.’” 38 As one can see, Heaven acquired a metaphysical quality in orthodox
Neo-Confucianism inseparable from human nature, and not so much as a distinct and superior
entity that acts as a moral judge of humanity. In short, the most authoritative interpretation of
Heaven in seventeenth-century Neo-Confucianism, as represented by Zhu Xi’s Collected
Commentaries of the Four Books, contradicted Couplet’s claim that Confucius sought to regulate
human actions based on a uniform set of “laws and precepts of the supreme divine will.” Naturally,
the Jesuits found this version of Heaven disagreeable to their religious agenda, since the Christian
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perception of Heaven was founded on the notion that divinity and humanity were inherently
distinct and interacted with each other based on a strict hierarchy; hence the need for absolute
obedience towards Heaven. 39
The Jesuit’s resolve to obscure Zhu Xi’s influence over Confucius’ Heaven was a large
part of why they opted for the commentary of the Ming Dynasty (1368 - 1644) statesman Zhang
Juzheng (张居正 1525 - 1582), Direct Commentary on the Four Books (Sishu Zhijie 四书直解),
as their primary source material due to its presentation of a much more palatable understanding of
Heaven. Although Zhang Juzheng, like most other Neo-Confucian scholars of the Ming Dynasty,
drew heavily upon Zhu Xi’s interpretations of the Four Books on many subjects, he envisioned a
much more concrete and personal Heaven compared to the amorphous li-principle. Notably, in his
commentary on Lunyu, Zhang Juzheng repeatedly emphasized the need to fear and revere Heaven
as an ultimate source of reward and punishment, thus recognizing it as a self-contained and
purposeful entity. As he proclaimed in his writings: “There is only one heaven which should be
honored to the highest degree and that nothing else is equal to it.” 40 This theological interpretation
of Heaven did not originate from Zhang Juzheng, but can in fact be traced back to the idea of “the
mutual interaction between heaven and men” (天人感应 tianren ganying) from the Han dynasty
(206 BCE – 220 CE), which became popular again in late-Ming and was subsequently adopted by
Zhang Juzheng.41 This model of “mutual interaction” founded upon the absolute subordination of
men towards Heaven closely aligned with Christian ideology, and therefore served as a strong
indication of the Chinese’s pious nature in the Jesuits’ reports back to Europe.

Yu Liu, “Behind the Façade,” 21.
Meynard, CSP, 36-7. Chinese Text: “盖天下之至尊而无对者，惟天而已。”
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Another ideological ammunition that Zhang Juzheng lent to the Jesuit was the notion that
Confucianism was the purest and most orthodox philosophical school in China. In the letter to
King Louis, Couplet cited a phrase from Lunyu passage 2.16, gong hu yiduan (攻乎异端), which
he translated as “to attack heresies,” to advance his argument that “there was nothing higher in
[Confucius’] list of priorities than thoroughly overthrowing the foreign sects and doctrines by
which, he was wont to say, nations were destroyed and dynasties brought down.”42 Here, the strong
wording of “attacking heresies” imbued an orthodoxic tone to Confucianism. In his translation and
annotation of CSP, Meynard points out that Zhu Xi’s commentary interpreted the phrase as “to
study aberrant teaching brings harm,” whereas Couplet designated the word yiduan as “heresy” to
introduce the dichotomy of orthodoxy and heterodoxy into Confucianism.43 The Jesuits’ religious
agenda became more pronounced when Couplet brought up how Louis IV, who he referred to as
“the most Christian King of all the Christian countries in the world,” would be exalted by
Confucius for eradicating heresy in Europe by bringing down “the edicts of the past.” 44 This was
a reference to the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis IV in 1685, which outlawed the
practice of Protestantism in France on the grounds of heresy.
In other words, CSP did not stop at finding Christian values in Confucianism, but
specifically equated the philosophy with the doctrinal purity of Catholicism. By proclaiming
Confucius’ supposed intolerance towards competing sects, such as the vulgar Daoism and the
idolatrous Buddhism, Couplet presented the philosopher as the most faithful interpreter of ancient
wisdom. Thus, he hoped to inspire sympathy for Confucianism within the Catholic-ruled France
for how it appeared as the staunch protector and disseminator of orthodoxy. While Couplet’s stance
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seemed overtly self-serving and militant, he was in fact largely echoing Zhang Juzheng’s sentiment
when it comes to scorning the corrupting influence of Daoism and Buddhism in China. Regarding
the tendency among his contemporaries to take inspiration from Daoism and Buddhism when
interpreting Confucian texts, Zhang Juzheng reacted with worry and stern disapproval. 45 His
station as the Grand Secretary of Ming and the royal tutor sufficiently rationalized his advocacy
for the absolute authority of Confucianism, at least in the political realm, since the philosophy was
traditionally meant to serve the ruling elites. Still, the Jesuits believed that Zhang Juzheng’s
accusations of heterodoxy were too vague and insufficient. This compelled them to incorporate
the ideas of additional commentators who were more forward in defending the ideological purity
of Confucianism. Among those chosen were Song intellectual Cheng Yi (程颐 1033 – 1107) and
Ming historian Qiu Jun (邱濬 1418-1495), both of whom cautioned against heterodoxy’s potential
to bring about not only moral corruption, but also dynastic downfall, and their ideas were promptly
cited throughout CSP’s commentary on Lunyu.46 An interesting insight is thus revealed: the Jesuits
were exceedingly crafty and resourceful in the composition of their translation. They were clearly
well-acquainted with a wide range of commentarial works and demonstrated a keen understanding
of their merits and faults in relation to their objective of constructing a Christian interpretation of
the Four Books.
Overall, Couplet’s letter to the King represented only a small portion of the Jesuits’
rumination over the theological implications of Confucianism in CSP’s substantial preface;
however, it sufficiently exemplified the compulsion to interpret Confucianism according to a
Christianized and monotheistic framework, resulting in likely the deliberate distortions of their
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Chinese source materials. Having laid out sweeping claims over the moral piety of Confucian
China and its readiness to receive Christian revelation due to its pre-existing religious
consciousness, the main body of the CSP sought to offer textual evidence for these claims through
the careful selection of commentaries that complemented Jesuit agenda posing as Confucius’
intended meaning. I will examine several passages relating to the idea of Ren to demonstrate how
Confucian morality was presented to be in tune with Christian principles.
Ren, the defining yet elusive concept of Confucian thought, was extensively discussed in
Lunyu, often taking shape as dialogues between Confucius and his disciples on the theoretical and
practical nature of this supreme virtue. 47 CSP equated Ren to “charity and piety”, “true virtue of
the heart”, and “universal love,” among many others. 48 Since Régis’ review served as an
introduction to the religious reading of Confucianism in Europe, let us first examine Ren as charity.
Lunyu passage 12.22 recorded a conversation between the Master and his disciple Fan Chi. CSP
translated the first part of the conversation as the following:
樊迟问仁。子曰：“爱人。”问知。子曰：“知人。”
Fan Chi asked again about the virtue of ren, or piety. Confucius answered: “To love
people so that you embrace and cherish everyone in the wide bosom of charity.”
Similarly, Fan Chi asked about prudence, to which Confucius answered: “To know
people.”49
In the classical text, Confucius responded to the first question simply with ai ren (爱人), which
literally means “to love people.” The latter part of the sentence about charity for all of mankind
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was added on as a Jesuit interpretation. Meynard remarks that Zhang Juzheng’s commentary
explained Confucius’ notion of “love” as contingent on the level of intimacy in one’s relationship
to another.50 The Jesuits, however, deviated from Zhang Juzheng by defining the act of “to love
people” as universal and intrinsic, which was more in accordance with the Christian commandment
of “love thy neighbor as thyself.” The Jesuits’ emphasis on unconditional love for all of humanity
in Confucianism is interesting in how it contradicted the rest of passage 12.22. When Fan Chi
expressed confusion towards his Master’s response, Confucius elaborated: “One should raise and
promote the right and honest people to rule the country, and should ignore the perverse and
dishonest people. By doing this, the dishonest people can be changed into right and honest
people.”51 Such a statement did not properly reflect the Christian charity of having compassion
and love even for the unworthy; instead, it evoked a sense of pragmatism, specifically in a political
context, by clearly differentiating the treatment between honest and dishonest people with the goal
of promoting morality.
This is not the only place where the Jesuits encountered challenge in comparing Confucius’
highest virtue of Ren to Christian charity. For instance, CSP translated passage 4.3 of Lunyu as:
“Confucius said: ‘Only someone honest can safely love people and safely hate them.” 52
Interestingly, the word “honest” in this translation corresponded to Ren in the Chinese text; yet,
unlike in 12.22, the Jesuits did not elucidate in their Latin translation that the virtue of Ren was
mentioned in this passage. No doubt, the fact that Confucius proclaimed that someone who attained
the ultimate virtue of Ren can still rightfully express hate for others greatly troubled the Jesuits.
Therefore, they chose the word “honest” as a stand-in for Ren in this passage, a quality that held

50

Meynard, Lunyu, 383.
Meynard, Lunyu, 383. Chinese text: 子曰：“举直错诸枉，能使枉者直”
52
Meynard, Lunyu, 184. Chinese text: 子曰：“唯仁者能好人，能恶人。”
51

Rachel Yang

24

more ambivalence in Christian doctrines compared to the undeniably laudable quality of being
charitable. As one can see, CSP manipulated the vast interpretive potential of Ren according to the
contexts of different Lunyu passages, sometimes deliberately allowing its appearance in the
Chinese text to become lost in translation, in order to support the narrative that Confucianism had
been nurturing various virtues necessary for Christian enlightenment.
The Jesuits, by presenting Ren as charity, hoped to stress universal love as an important
theme in Confucianism and its most crucial congruence with Christianity. As an example of their
attempt to expound the unifying and almost spiritual potential of Ren, let us return to passage 6.28
in Lunyu, the very one that Pierre Régis deemed to be illustrious enough for Confucianism to recite
in full when reviewing CSP:
子贡曰：“如有博施于民而能济众，何如？可谓仁乎？”子曰：“何事与仁，
比也圣乎！尧舜其犹病诸。夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人。能近取
譬，可谓仁之方也己。”
Zigong said, “If there is someone who is generous to his people and works to give
relief to all those in need, what do you think of him? Can he be called [Ren]?”
The Master said, “This is no longer a matter of [Ren]. You must be referring to a
sage. Even Yao and Shun found it difficult to accomplish what you’ve just
described. A [Ren] person wishes to steady himself, and so he helps others to steady
themselves. Because he wishes to reach his goal, he helps others to reach theirs.
The ability to make analogy from what is close at hand is the method and the way
of realizing [Ren].53
The conventional interpretation among historical and modern commentators was that, in this
exchange, the Master reprimanded Zigong for speculating about some grand yet unrealistic
hypotheticals without taking the most fundamental steps towards cultivating Ren, that is
introspection and self-improvement. Once a person rights his own character, he will naturally be
able to extend the same care and aspirations for himself to others through empathy and compassion.
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The Jesuits, on the other hand, perceived this passage as a perfect rendition of universal
love. Consequently, they set out to expand beyond the classical text by adding the following
framing statements to contextualize the translation:
Indeed, my disciple, the holiness, charity, or piety that I request, this is the constant
disposition of the mind conforming to reason, by which one abandon his selfinterest and the care for his comfort and embrace all the people on earth, just as if
they were a single, unique entity […] Once this charity, or piety, seizes the human
mind, then all humanity on the whole earth will be like one family, and even like
one man. Because of an awesome connection and order everywhere between the
highest, intermediate, and smallest things, this will look like one identical
substance.54
The Jesuits chose this occasion to endow immense gravity to Ren by equating it with holiness,
charity, and piety, rather than merely “honesty,” as they did in Lunyu 4.3. This Latin translation
suggested that a person with Ren will be able to extend his endless wealth of love towards all
humanity and reserve nothing for his self-interest, an antithesis to the interpretation that selfcultivation was a pre-requisite for doing good for others. In fact, in the classical text, the definition
of Ren proposed by Zigong and subsequently rejected by Confucius bore a striking resemblance
to the Jesuits’ ambitiously selfless man. When Zigong asked whether a person who strives to help
everyone deserves to be called Ren, Confucius replied that such an action would not indicate Ren,
but a saintliness that even the ancient sage kings such as Yao and Shun could not achieve. The
Jesuits, however, interpreted the saintliness (translated into Latin as “holiness”) that Confucius
spoke of as unattainable only due to the lack of God’s grace, yet it was still a vision that everyone
should strive towards. 55 With this logic in mind, CSP was able to resolve the Master’s incredulous
attitude towards the prospect of helping all of humanity and present the message of passage 6.28
as such:
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Just as a pious person wishes himself to succeed and flourish, similarly he devotes
his action, influence, and strength to life all those who have been stricken by innate
poverty or infirmity, or crushed and destroyed by some more serious accident of
fortune. Similarly, wishing to see all things, he cannot stand seeing others erring
blindly, or falling vanquished by pains and hardships. He himself attempts and
undertakes everything to help everyone. He makes them solve and unravel the
hardships they face, and successfully surmount the darkness of their errors and
ignorance.56
The Jesuits cleverly reversed the subject of emphasis when translating this maxim. Whereas
Confucius tried to redirect his disciple’s attention from being pre-occupied with the hypothetical
of caring for all under heaven to first cultivating one’s own character (i.e. “the ability to make
analogy from what is close at hand”), the Jesuits urged the readers to transcend the boundary of
individual existence and treat everyone with the same love and care as if they all stem from the
same being, thus completely forgoing one’s self-interest.
Yet, CSP’s expansion upon the classical text was not a baseless and delusional effusion
that saw implications of divinity and transcendence where there was none. Zhu Xi ad Zhang
Juzheng, the two most prominent predecessors for the Jesuits, both understood the virtue of
universal love as the unspoken message of passage 6.28. As Zhu Xi explained in his commentary:
“a person who possesses Ren sees the myriad things in heaven and earth as a single body, that is
himself. Recognizing it as himself, there are no lengths he is not willing to go [for others] …”57
Interestingly, Zhu Xi’s metaphysical penchant previously rejected by the Jesuits ended up
complementing their agenda on this occasion. Zhang Juzheng, who closely heeded Zhu Xi’s
commentarial tradition, wrote regarding this passage that “all under heaven for one family; the
myriad things form the disposition of one entity.”58 Meynard further hypothesized that the Jesuits
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might have taken the idea of universe as a single entity as an affirmation of the Christian dogma
that “all humanity recapitulates itself in one man, Jesus Christ”––one further reason to equate Ren
with a piousness that proved the religious consciousness of Confucianism. 59
Lastly, another reason that makes passage 6.28 a singular case study of CSP’s rhetoric and
methodology lies in how it conveyed the craftiness of the Jesuits translation. They expertly
cherrypicked threads from several commentaries to weave together a Christian narrative in the
Four Books, taking full advantage of Zhu and Zhang’s words where they fed into such narrative
and leaving them out where they introduced inconsistencies, all the while demonstrating an
admirable knowledge of Confucian intellectual tradition. With such careful orchestration, it is no
wonder that European theologians such as Régis would lavish praise and attention onto the Chinese
sage for how his teachings seemingly captured the essence of Christianity through perfect natural
reasoning despite the lack of proper enlightenment.

1.2 Confucianism against the Reason of State
So far, I have used excerpts from the Preface and Lunyu sections of CSP to illustrate the
ways in which it attempted to present a Christianized interpretation of Confucianism, both
explicitly and implicitly. I will now examine a key reason behind the Jesuits’ vehement advocacy
for the virtue and the theological integrity of this pagan philosopher, which was to counter the
rising moral skepticism in the late seventeenth-century Europe that threatened the power of the
Catholic Church.60 The goal is to demonstrate how the missionaries leveraged Confucianism to
address the diminishing role of moralism in European statecraft, thus paving way for the Chinese

59

Meynard, Lunyu, 67.
Thierry Meynard, “Translating the Confucian Classics: the Lunyu in the Confucius Sinarum Philosophu (1687)”
in Sinologists as Translators in the Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries, ed. Lawrence Wangchi Wong and
Bernhard Fuehrer (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2016), 22-3.
60

Rachel Yang

28

example to become a vehicle of intellectual discourse that fueled the emergence of the
Enlightenment mentality.
Since their arrival in China in the late sixteenth century, driven by the grandiose vision of
bringing Christian enlightenment to this vast and isolated kingdom, the Jesuits had their eyes set
on Confucianism as the key to the success of their conversion mission. Uninterested in penetrating
the common populace and spreading Christianity from the bottom up, the Jesuits eagerly sought
out the friendship and patronage of scholar-officials in the imperial court, who by definition and
tradition were educated as Confucian literati, to ascend quickly on the social and political ladders. 61
This top-down conversion strategy was consistent with the Jesuit operation in Europe, where they
ingratiated themselves with monarchs who demonstrated support for the Catholic agenda, as can
be gleamed from Couplet’s flattering dedication to Louis XIV in CSP.62 Therefore, this close
alignment with the Chinese elite gave away the political agenda behind the missionaries’ enterprise
to study and translate Confucian texts. Since Confucianism consistently served as the ideological
and operational backbone of the Chinese bureaucracy for nearly two millennia, the Jesuits
developed a natural affinity and admiration for it as a state-sponsored religion that successfully
ingrained its moral teachings into the rulers’ conducts. Moreover, the Jesuits shrewdly discerned
Confucianism’s potential to affirm the place of Christian virtues in statecraft, and consequently
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amplify the political influence of the Society once its teachings become broadly admired in
Europe.63
Among the Four Books, Daxue (大学), or “The Great Learning,” provided most solid and
straightforward evidence for Confucianism’s utility as a political philosophy. An important
concept explained in Daxue was the so-called “ordering of the world” (jingshi 经世), which
mandated that the promotion of peace and order in a kingdom must start with the ruler’s inner
cultivation. The Song-Ming Neo-Confucian tradition related this concept to the classical
Confucian expression of “sageliness within and kingliness without” (neisheng waiwang
内圣外王).64 Together, the two ideas revealed the social and relational nature of the philosophy,
for its teachings sought beyond benefitting the individual with the ultimate goal of servicing the
collective. The gravity of “ordering the world” can be gleamed from the fact that in the Confucian
curriculum established by Zhu Xi, Daxue came first in a student’s study. 65 The seventeenth century,
which saw not only the conception of CSP but also the dynastic transition from Ming to Qing
(1636 -1912), inspired an urgency among Confucian scholars to act upon the principle of “ordering
of the world” in a time of palpable and irresistible societal changes. 66 Zhang Juzheng, an important
Confucian literati and statesman of the time, incorporated this activism into his commentary on
the Four Books, which he wrote as a textbook for the young prince under his tutelage. Therefore,
it is likely that the late-Ming and early-Qing preoccupation with exerting “kingliness without” to
restore social order helped affirmed the Jesuits’ conviction that Chinese statecraft was centered on
the presence of a virtuous monarch, who perfected himself according to the teachings of the sage
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and consequently promoting peace and virtue throughout his kingdom. In other words, it appeared
that Heaven, which the Jesuits believed to be the source of morality in Confucianism, and the state
were inseparable in China.
Such an understanding was crucial to the Jesuits’ agenda of advocating Confucianism in
seventeenth century Europe. Let us turn our attention once again to Philippe Couplet’s letter to
Louis IV, which revealed right from the start the undeniably political dimension of CSP. Recall
that in the letter, Couplet eulogized the monarch for revoking the Edict of Nantes, a political move
that fortified the power of the Catholic Church in France. But more interestingly, Couplet tried to
present Confucianism as an anti-Machiavellian philosophy for the Princes. He ecstatically
imagined that, should Confucius find his way to seventeenth-century France, “he will declare that
he has found at last that Prince whom he had burned to see with an ardor that had until now been
in vain;” that he would submit to King Louis’ wisdom “like Stars to the Sun” because the Chinese
sage “had conceived in his mind such an outstanding Emperor and he had sketched his outline in
his books, but yet, amid the ancestral Princes of the Empire, he could find no one who truly
conformed to his wishes,” that is, until the reign of Louis IV.67 The extend of Couplet’s flattery
was rather astounding, proclaiming the French King as the paragon of Confucian virtue that none
of the Chinese emperors throughout the millennials could hope to match. Couplet’s explicit
reasoning was that, by persecuting the Protestants and restoring Christianity to its purest form
represented by Catholicism, Louis IV understood Confucius’ mission as an inheritor and
disseminator of ancient wisdom. However, while Couplet’s letter pointed to religious dissents as
the principal threat to a virtuous and stable society, there was in fact another implicit enemy that
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he hoped to condemn by promoting Confucianism as political philosophy, that is, an atheistic
approach to rulership exemplified by the Reason of State.68
Couplet’s basis for using Confucianism to attack the Reason of State rested on the
aforementioned principle of “ordering of the world” found in Daxue. As an example of Daxue’s
rhetorical style, its approach on governance, and how it complemented Jesuit agenda, the following
translated passage from CSP is particularly illustrative:
物格而后知至，知至而后意诚，意诚而后心正，心正而后修身，身修而后家
齐，家齐而后国治，国治而后天下平。
When everything has been deeply penetrated within, or exhausted, then next the
intellective power will be brought to completion and made perfect. When the
intellective power has been brought to completion and made perfect, then next the
intention and the will are checked… When the intention has been checked, then
next the mind will be rectified…When the mind has been rectified, then the body
will be well composed…When the person, or the body, has been well composed,
then the domestic family will be well educated through this example. When the
domestic family has been correctly educated, then one’s private kingdom will be
correctly managed. When the kingdom has been well governed, then all the Empire
will be optimally educated and will thoroughly enjoy peace. 69
This excerpt outlined the process of creating a peaceful and unified society, starting with correcting
one’s innermost character. Differently from the maxims of Lunyu, which speaks about conducts
and virtues that should be broadly emulated across society, this passage from Daxue applies more
specifically to the ruler of a nation, or at least high-ranking officials, in leading up to the ultimate
goal of correctly managing one’s private kingdom, its corresponding Chinese phrase translates
directly into “bringing peace to all under Heaven” (ping tianxia 平天下). One can also see the
rhetorical use of logical progression in this passage, with the step-by-step ascension from the
lowest order of one’s intellective power, to the physical body, to the private family, and finally to
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conducting the affairs of the state naturally and virtuously. Thus, an important observation about
Confucian statecraft arises from this ascension of order: consistent with teachings of Lunyu,
Confucianism maintained self-cultivation as a pre-requisite to acquiring a virtuous persona and
exerting a positive influence onto others. It was a verity that made no exception, and perhaps was
more essential than ever, for the Son of Heaven (tianzi 天子) tasked with ensuring the well-being
of all his subjects. Contemporary Confucian scholar Bai Tongdong, in focusing on the political
utility of introspection and cultivating family relations, argues that their ultimate purpose is to
develop the compassion of the ruler. He explains that in Confucianism, understanding how one’s
own body and desires functions as a steppingstone to attending to the needs of others. Having selflove naturally transfers to one’s immediate family through the expression of filial piety, which in
turn extends into one’s interactions in broader society. 70 A virtuous Prince, then, should strive
towards loving and understanding his people as if he loves and understands himself and his family,
seeing no boundary between the private and the public.
The Jesuits saw another dimension to moral cultivation in Confucian statecraft that was
infinitely attractive. As Daniel Canaris has observed, Daxue confirmed that good governance
depended on the ruler’s sound moral conscious and genuine deference to the laws of the Heaven
and rejected the practice of “[prioritizing] the conservation and expansion of the state over the
observance of moral percepts” exemplified by the Reason of State. 71 CSP seized the lessons from
Daxue as an opportunity to lay forth the claims that an atheist yet prosperous society cannot exist,
and that China always had knowledge of the True God as shown by the internalization of a
hierarchical structure. In the Preface of CSP, Couplet addressed the apparent paradox that while
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ancient China only had natural religion, it maintained good life for its citizens, a moral public, and
a fair government that could only be founded upon a true religion. 72 Couplet looked to the
distinctive Confucian virtue of filial piety and the mirroring between the private and the public
realms to argue for importance of religion in Chinese political system, replacing the centrality of
humanity that Bai Tongdong perceives:
[The ancient Chinese] teach that the subjects should serve their ruler the same way
as the rulers and the nations all serve the supreme Emperor of heaven, and that the
children should obey their parents in the same way as they themselves obey heaven.
Yet if the religious worship are false and deceitful, then the obedience and
observance toward rulers and rulers and kings, as well as piety toward parents and
ancestors, are necessarily false as well. 73
In other words, Couplet observed that a hierarchical structure based on absolute obedience and
respect for one’s superior permeated throughout both the private and the public spaces of Chinese
society. This led him to conclude that this hierarchy was modeled after the collective reverence
towards the supreme mandate of the Heaven, or as the Jesuits believed, the true God. As the Daxue
passage above suggested, a ruler cannot establish peace and order in his kingdom without first
nurturing a healthy family dynamic. Since the same reverence and piety towards Heaven was
practiced even on the most basic level of social interactions such as between parents and children,
husbands and wives, the Jesuit concluded the benevolence of the prince must also be internalized
virtues rather than a pretense grounded in the pragmaticism of the Reason of State. Couplet cited
the virtue of “honesty” (cheng 诚), which was a recurring motif in the pedagogy of Song-Ming
Neo-Confucian commentators, to pose Reason of State and Confucianism as ideological antitheses:
Would they [the Song-Ming commentators], then, in the most important matter of
religion, have been insincere and treacherous politicians? Would they have
embraced religion only as a deceitful mean for keeping the people in check?
Those atheo-political innovators, the interpreters of the Song dynasty, would
surely never admit it. Even though they created a hollow monster out of their
72
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political divinity, they never hesitated to make truth and solidity, expressed by the
word of cheng, the basis of their whole Philosophy.74
The “atheo-political innovators” of Song was no doubt referring to Zhu Xi, whose metaphysical
conception of Heaven kept his name largely out of CSP’s annotations and acknowledgements. But
what is important here is Couplet’s argument that even the thinkers who misunderstood Heaven
or denied the existence of a personal God had insisted on the sincerity of virtue, or the conformity
between intention and action, of a Confucian ruler, just as the phrase so wisely summarized:
“sageliness within and kingliness without.”
In sum, CSP leveraged ideals such as filial piety and self-cultivation in Confucian statecraft
for two main purposes. Firstly, they complemented the CSP’s overarching goal of presenting the
Chinese civilization as semi-enlightened with the knowledge of a supreme divine in a Christian
sense. Since Confucianism, the most widely practiced school of thoughts in China, advocated for
the careful observance of social hierarchy and respect for one’s superior even in private sphere,
the Chinese must possess a religious conscience that was carefully and sincerely cultivated.
Secondly, and more implicitly, since Confucian political philosophy stressed moral cultivation as
an essential lesson for the Prince, the Jesuits used it to refute the possibility of having a prosperous
society solely founded on the Reason of State without an internalized moral code. With this
observation in mind, CSP raised the Chinese example to both Louis VI and the French public in a
bid to combat the postulation of an atheist state yet healthy state, affirm the necessity of religion
in rulership, and consequently strengthen the Jesuits’ political status in Europe.
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1.3 Lettre sur la Morale (1688): an Early Vernacular Translation
The scholarly diligence and the political scheming that the Jesuits poured into the making
of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus seemed to have paid off, as this Christianized interpretation of
Confucianism captivated French scholars immediately upon its publication in 1687. From then on,
this comprehensive translation of Confucian canons became one of the principal sources for
Europe’s venture to understand and engage with Chinese philosophy. Pierre Régis’ book review
in Journal des Sçavants was only a preamble to the vibrant intellectual reactions that Confucianism
provoked in Europe, and the manifold ways in which the philosophy was interpreted, distorted,
and transformed under a vastly different cultural context. This section will turn to one of the first
substantial scholarly works inspired by CSP that followed its religious reading of Confucianism,
in attempt to measure the direct impact of its Christianized interpretation and, more broadly
speaking, the power of translation in appropriating and reimagining foreign ideologies.
In 1688, there appeared an abridged French translation of CSP titled Lettre sur la Morale
de Confucius, Philosophe de la Chine. It contained a brief preface, selected passages from the three
Confucian texts translated by the Jesuits, and an anonymous author signing himself as “S.F.” Based
on the initial, historian commonly attributed this translation to the French intellectual and Catholic
theologian Simon Foucher (1644-1696). Similar to Couplet and his colleagues, Foucher’s
objective was to extract the essence of Confucian wisdom based on a Christian understanding, and
to reconstruct the classical text in a way that would accentuate such an understanding to the readers.
Yet, in sharp contrast with the translation style of CSP that relied on elaborated commentary to
make sense of the elusive maxims, Lettre sur la Morale was characterized by its succinct and often
terse paraphrasing of Jesuits’ interpretation that removed any room for ambiguity and debate
around Confucius’ stance on issues such as charity, piety, and human nature. In other words, while
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the Latin translation interpolated Christian ideologies by filling in the gaps that the classical texts
left up to interpretation, Foucher’s version opted for condensation and the removal of cultural
nuance to assert Confucianism’s compatibility with Christianity in a way that was easily accessible
to the French readers.
To illustrate the rhetorical style and the religious agenda of Lettre sur la Morale, I will turn
to the following passage from Lunyu as an example:
子曰：“君子无所争。必也射乎！揖让而升，下而饮。其争也君子。”
The Master said: “Gentlemen have no reason to contend. But, of course, there is
the archery contest. Yet on such occasions, they bow and yield to each other as they
ascend the steps to the hall; afterward, they descend the steps and drink together.
Even when they compete, they are gentlemanly.” 75
The “gentleman” (junzi 君子), sometimes translated as an “exemplary person,” made over one
hundred appearances in Lunyu and stands as a Confucian ideal as distinguished as Ren. 76 The two
concepts are also intimately related to one another: the title of a gentleman typically denotes
someone who either possesses ren or is on the self-perfecting path to attain this supreme virtue. In
the above passage, the Master highlighted the importance of rituals in guiding the interactions
between gentlemen, as shown through the ritualized acts of bowing and drinking before and after
an archery contest. It is necessary here to briefly explain the unique function of rituals in
Confucianism. As previously established, Confucianism is a human-centered philosophy that
perceives individuals as fundamentally relational beings whose identity and humanity can only
develop in a social context. Essentially, if everyone adhered to sets of ritualistic conducts specific
to different social scenarios, social harmony will flourish, and each person will be able to fulfill
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their respective relational roles and cultivate virtuous personalities. A gentleman, having fully
internalized these ritual processes that he behaves according to them naturally, would remain
collected, respectful, and just even during a competition, understanding the ultimately social
purpose of such occasion. Both Zhu Xi and Zhang Juzheng took care to further contextualize the
ritual process from the ancient times for their readers and distinguished the formalized competition
between gentlemen from the quarrels of “petty persons” (xiaoren 小人). The heart of the lesson
therefore lies in the last sentence: “Even when they compete, they are gentlemanly.”
Provided with the nuanced cultural and ideological context to the archery contest maxim,
its dramatic alteration in Lettre sur la Morale appears jarring. In Simon Foucher’s words, the
passage above crystallized into the following statement: “Entre les personnes éclairées, il n'y a pas
lieu de contester.”77 Besides the bluntness of tone that characterized Foucher’s translation, there
are several other problems deserving of attention. Firstly, a “gentleman” becomes an “enlightened
person,” whereas CSP translated the term as “serious and honest men,” thereby introducing a
spiritual undertone that was absent in both the classical and the Latin texts. Secondly, the
framework of an archery contest was completely removed, leaving only the first sentence to fend
for itself when it was only meant to serve as an introduction to the main point on the function of
social rituals the making of a gentleman. It is important to note here that Foucher’s inadequate
translation was due to no fault of the Latin source material. Not only was the archery contest
soundly preserved in CSP, but the Jesuits even meticulously described the rituals of bowing and
drinking according to Zhang Juzheng’s commentary, with details such as “[the gentlemen]
respectfully bow three times to their fellows, and three times they invite them to go first; only then
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can they enter the hall.”78 Given that the Jesuits had correctly understood the relationship between
rituals and virtues to be the essence of this lesson, the liability of misrepresentation and
misinterpretation fell heavily onto Foucher. 79
Regarding the deliberate purging of textual nuance in Lettre sur la Morale, Thierry
Meynard explains: “Foucher was not so much interested in learning something new as much as
interested in using Chinese culture to prove the universality of moral laws.” 80 Indeed, using CSP
as its launching point, Foucher’s translation marked a further departure from the reality of
Confucianism in China. This is a dissonance that would have completely eluded Foucher’s target
audience, which was the greater French-speaking public, who likely found the voluminous Latin
translation inaccessible and its annotations superfluous. There was undoubtedly an appeal and a
clear rationale to Foucher’s decontextualization. His foremost mission was not to do justice to the
discursive style of the classical Confucian text, but to succinctly and colloquially convey the
agreement between Confucian and Christian that the Jesuits had so painstakingly illustrated
through their magnum opus. If he had decided to include the various culture-specific elements of
Confucian texts such as the archery contest, it might encourage his readers to immerse in the mis
en scene of ancient China, and thus lose sight of the fact that Confucian wisdom was essentially
echoing Christian principles. Furthermore, these curious details could easily distract the readers
from the spiritual message and invite secular interest and investigation into ancient Chinses culture,
which was a not the sort of conversations that Foucher hoped to inspire. Therefore, by removing
the cultural peculiarities in Confucianism, Foucher was able to keep CSP’s religious agenda while
also introducing Chinese intellectual thoughts to a wider readership.
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To Foucher, the true wonder of Confucianism was how a pagan philosopher living
centuries before the arrival of Christ was able to adequately, and even admirably, replicate many
Christian virtues in his teachings, which were adopted as the orthodoxy of a powerful ancient
civilization. This could only speak to the intrinsicality and the timelessness of Christian ideals, and
this was the key takeaway that Foucher hoped for his readers in a time when the relevance of
religious consciousness was visibly eroding in European public. This was in fact also one of the
chief propositions of CSP, demonstrated by its portrayal of Confucius as “the Wisest Teacher and
Oracle of both Moral and Political Philosophy” who derived certain eternal truths “by the light of
nature and reason alone.”81 In other words, the philosophizing of a truly wise and virtuous man
would ultimately lead him to the wisdom of God even without reading the scriptures. Foucher’s
reinterpretation of the Lunyu passage, “entre les personnes éclairées, il n'y a pas lieu de contester,”
seems to implicate such a sentiment. While “éclairées” can signify “touched by the light of God,”
it also inevitably calls to mind the “enlightened” philosophes that would shape the next century of
European history. Foucher seems to proclaim through Confucius that religious piety and natural
reason were essentially the same, that the deference to Christian truths served as a unifying force
among the truly enlightened, regardless of cultural or ideological disparity.
Foucher’s laid down his dedication to promoting the Christianized interpretation of
Confucianism in his brief preface to Lettre sur la Morale. “On voit chez Confucius comme un
crayon ou une ombre du christianisme, & aussi un abrégé de tout ce que les philosophes avaient
reconnu de plus solide en matière de morale,” wrote Foucher to an unspecified “Monsieur.” 82 In
making the Eurocentric claim that Confucian thoughts were only a rough sketch, an inkling to the
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coming of Christ and his teachings, Foucher set up his agenda for the rest of the work, which was
to demonstrate the omnipresence of Christian ideals. Confucianism, albeit only a crude and
imperfect rendering of these ideals, had allowed an ancient and virtuous civilization to flourish.
Foucher ended his preface with the following thought: “Au reste, Monsieur, ces enseignements ne
sont pas seulement bons pour les gens de la Chine, mais je suis persuadé qu’il y a peu de Français
qui ne s’estimât fort sage & fort heureux s’il les pouvait réduire en pratique.” 83 Thus, it seemed
that Foucher had inherited onto himself CSP’s mission of leveraging Confucianism to counter the
diminishing authority of the Church in Europe towards the end of the seventeenth century. In
suggesting the French to take the heavily Christianized maxims to heart and put them into practice,
Foucher sought to reassert the relevance of religious consciousness and moral cultivation in
governance as well as everyday life.
So far, I have presented three versions of the Confucian texts: the classical text interpreted
by Song-Ming Confucian scholars, CSP’s Latin translation built upon these commentaries, and
Foucher’s French translation based on CSP. From CSP to Foucher, we perceive a fascinating and
dynamic transformation taking place with the classical texts. First, the Jesuits enthusiastically
expanded upon the Four Books in their attempt to render the elusive maxims more accessible to
European readers and to weave in a Christian narrative. Yet, the Jesuits were not so much abusing
their power as the translators as following the commentarial conventions essential to the Confucian
scholarship. Incorporating the ideas of several renowned sources such as Zhu Xi and Zhang
Juzheng while demonstrating a nuanced understanding of classical and Neo-Confucian ideas, CSP
can be considered as a commentarial work with its own integrity. Since the “original” meanings
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behind Confucius’ words were lost to history, despite Couplet’s repeated claims that the Jesuits
were representing the true intentions of the Master, commentaries became the default means of
engaging with the Four Books and a source of evolving interpretations. CSP’s unique contribution
as a commentary lies in proposing a Christianized interpretation that helped Confucianism find
relevance in a new ideological and cultural milieu. This version of Confucianism was then
aggressively decontextualized by Foucher to further demonstrate the universal appeal of Christian
principles. These two layers of translations put the Four Books through a streamlined process of
expansion and contraction that removed the text further and further away from its roots, while its
semblance to Western thinking, specifically Judeo-Christian traditions, became increasingly clear.
Once displaced in Europe, the cultural nuance that Confucianism accumulated in China was
instantly stripped of its relevancy as a vastly different group of thinkers read new meanings into
these foreign texts, transforming them into a vehicle of discourse with which these thinkers can
advance their own ideological agenda. In the next chapter, I will investigate how the image of
Confucianism evolved under the treatment of radical Enlightenment thinkers by offering immense
opportunities for appropriation in a time of changing intellectual currents.
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CHAPTER II. The Revision of the “Chinese Example” under Freethinkers and
Philosophes
Europe had spiraled for some years into, as historian Paul Hazard coins it, a “Crisis of
Conscience” when Confucius Sinarum Philosophus made its timely debut in 1687. As not only the
fruits of Jesuits’ century-long assimilation in China, but also an ideological leverage to counteract
heterodoxy’s brewing momentum in Europe, Hazard deems CSP to be “a work concerned less
with science than with doctrine, less with facts, as such, than with the interpretation of facts…” 84
Yet, that was hardly a concern for the European thinkers captured by the wisdom of the Chinese
Sage. In inspiring figures such as Pierre Régis and Simon Foucher, who reiterated and reinforced
the Christianized reading of Confucianism, it seemed that CSP had contributed the right
momentum to the fin de siècle push and pull between religion and reason. “Thus then,” observes
Hazard, “were these soldiers of Christ armed with weapons calculated to serve them in good stead
in the battle lay before them.”85
But Couplet and his colleagues were not the only group to recognize and exploit the
interpretive potential of an imported philosophy. By giving Europeans access to Chinese thoughts
and culture through translation, the Jesuits had unwittingly placed ammunition in their opponents’
hands. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, opponents to the old religious order were
growing in both number and formidability when they encountered Confucianism. Known as the
freethinkers (also referred to as libertines or rationalists), these intellectuals were not united by any
specific set of doctrines beyond their shared desire to rebel against religious orthodoxy, thus
making them a provocative and dangerous presence to the Jesuits. 86 Often considered as the
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predecessors to the eighteenth-century philosophes, the freethinker’s engagement with
Confucianism in advancing their ideological agenda paved way for its popularity during the High
Enlightenment (circa 1730-1780), in which the image of China often took the center-stage
philosophical discourses rather than remaining as a niche interest or an ephemeral cultural trend.
So, with the approach of a new century, the Christianized reading of Confucianism would
gradually lose its influence as the philosophy became abundantly cited in radical Enlightenment
discourse.87
Though the “Crisis of European Conscience” was a deeply influential idea, scholars no
longer see Hazard’s designation of the late-seventeenth century as a period of pivotal transition
from religious superstition to enlightened and rational debates to be adequate.88 Damien Tricoire,
for instance, argues that the late seventeenth-century religious disputes within the Catholic Church
“were a decisive factor in inventing the philosophe’s persona” in the eighteenth century. 89 This
positions the Jesuit missionaries and the theologians as equally legitimate participants of early
Enlightenment conversation as the freethinkers, rather than putting them into an obsolete
ideological camp bound to be replaced by the Age of Reason. Consequently, it is imperative to see
CSP and its Christianized reading of Confucianism as a foundation and a precedent for the
secularized interpretations of China. So, under this continued process of interpretation and
appropriation from the missionaries to the freethinkers and finally to the philosophes,
Confucianism departed further from its cultural nuances until it flattened into a paradigmatic image
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synonymous with wisdom, atheism, and civilization, neatly packaged for whenever there rises a
rhetorical need to invoke it.
The dominant twentieth-century historiography pronounced that, while China was
prominently featured in Enlightenment conversations, its integration was superficial since
intellectuals mostly used it to proclaim ideas that were already abound in Europe. In his
foundational study on the encounter between China and the French Enlightenment published in
1963, Basil Guy pronounces the verdict that, “while flattering itself that it was international or
cosmopolitan by the adoption of Chinese airs just as it adopted Persian, Indian, or even English
ones, the eighteenth century still remained French at heart.”90 Evidently, the French Enlightenment
could not be anything else but “French at heart,” but its reception of various foreign cultures merits
a more nuanced examination. Since Guy’s time, there have been notable attempts to challenge this
insistence on the failures of the Enlightenment. 91 Jürgen Osterhammel brings up the “model of
disillusioned humanism” to reconcile Enlightenment legacy with the inevitability of Eurocentrism.
The model maintains that “every culture contains a reservoir of meaning that, given sufficient
attention and interpretive effort, could be accessed even by outsiders.” 92 In other words, despite
the inadequacy of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, it was still possible that Europe became more
open to and aware of other cultural realities during that time. Antoine Lilti proposes that the
Enlightenment’s heritage has taken on a significance far beyond the beliefs and failures of the
philosophers who came to represent it. Thus, Lilti argues, there is a need for us to “reclaim the
heritage of Enlightenment” and to reevaluate who, other than European thinkers, has played a part
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in producing this heritage, if it falls upon us to subvert the Eurocentric narrative of the age. 93 This
study on the reception of Confucianism in eighteenth-century France is essentially an attempt at
this “reclamation.” Expanding upon Lilti‘s statement, I argue that the appropriation of
Confucianism by the philosophes is crucial to the project of Global Enlightenment for how it
implicates an Asian intellectual tradition as a part of its heritage.
This chapter, indebted as it is to Guy’s comprehensive research on the subject, ultimately
seeks to reevaluate and nuance his claim regarding Enlightenment France’s engagement with
Confucianism by building upon recent scholarship that treat the Enlightenment as a part of global
history. I contend that it is no longer productive to indiscriminately treat the myriad forms of
French interest in China––cultural, intellectual, and anthropological––as either extensions of
“chinoiserie” or proto-orientalist misrepresentations simply due to the poorly-disguised
Eurocentrism that pervaded Enlightenment language. If CSP’s Christianized reading of Confucian
texts converted them into a Western intellectual lexicon to allow them to speak to the French public,
then the popularization of the Chinese example in High Enlightenment attested to the effectiveness
of this ideological “repackaging.” By examining the works of four French thinkers––François
Bernier, Pierre Bayle, Voltaire, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau––I will roughly outline the trajectory
of Confucianism’s integration into Enlightenment’s armory against religious orthodoxy. Parallel
to that is the trajectory of Confucianism’s increasing removal from its cultural reality which,
ironically, popularized it beyond the circle of sinologists and contributed momentum to some of
the most heated debates of the epoch on matters such as universalism, religious tolerance, and the
progress of civilizations.
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2.1 François Bernier’s “Introduction”: Towards a Secular Interpretation
June 7th, 1688, six months after Pierre Régis proclaimed Confucius’ allegiance to
Christianity, another CSP-inspired compte rendu, “Introduction à la lecture de Confucius,”
appeared in Le Journal des Sçavants. Its author was the French physician and travelogue-writer,
François Bernier (1620 - 1688), known to history as an ethnographer of the Mongol Empire and
one of the pioneers of modern race theory.94 “Le public est fort obligé au R.P. Couplet jésuite, qui
nous l’a apporté de la Chine,” wrote Bernier at the end of his piece in referring to the Confucian
canons translated in CSP.95 Unlike Régis, Bernier’s did not focus on reviewing the content of these
classics, nor was he preoccupied with assessing the religious integrity of the philosophy. Instead,
Bernier’s “Introduction” broadly surveyed three aspects of Chinese society which he believed were
shaped by Confucian ideology: its laws and government, the virtue of filial piety, and the example
of the Prince. In writing about each of these subjects, Bernier professed an unabashed admiration
for this distant land which appeared before him as a philosophical, eternal, and utopic Empire. If
Régis’ review demonstrated the effect that Confucianism could have on the imagination of a
religious-minded European reader, then Bernier’s “Introduction” heralded the passion that it would
stir up among the thinkers who worshipped the rational and the secular, who would eventually turn
the Jesuits’ weapon against them in a fight to undermine the Church’s domination over European
thoughts.
Bernier commenced his “Introduction” by citing China’s chronology that stretched over
four millennia and traced the origin of its civilization to the five legendary Sage Kings hailed by
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Confucianism as the epitome of virtue. Bernier claimed that laws and customs laid down by the
Sage Kings were so perfect that adhering to their ways promised peace and prosperity within the
Empire, while straying from them led to wars and misfortunes. The essence of the Sage Kings’
wisdom, Bernier proposed, was that “la vertue est le fondement du bon gouvernement, comme
étant impossible qu’un État soit bien gouverné à moins que le Prince & les sujets ne soient
véritablement & solidement vertueux.”96 And the most genius and exemplary way in which the
Chinese built a virtuous citizenry was through the cultivation of filial piety. This is a reverberation
of the ideas that Couplet extracted from Daxue and expanded upon in prefacing CSP. Recall that
an important part of the Jesuit’s political agenda was to pit Confucianism against the Reason of
State in emphasizing that a ruler must be equally virtuous in his actions and intentions to promote
peace and order. The practice of filial piety, according to Couplet, ensured that the subjects and
the ruler cultivate a relationship modeled after that of obedient children and a benevolent parent.
There was, however, a subtle rupture between Couplet and Bernier in how they perceived
filial piety’s connection with the idea of Heaven in Confucianism. Whereas Couplet saw filial
piety, in both the child-parent and subject-ruler contexts, as a mirroring of the ultimate reverence
towards a personal God that proved the religious consciousness of Confucianism, Bernier saw that:
“… les Loix doivent d’autant plus insister sur cette pieté paternelle, qu’elle est fondée dans la
nature, dans la justice, dans la raison, & par conséquent dans la volonté du Ciel qui nous a donné
la raison.” 97 Unlike Couplet, Bernier did not place a divine entity at the center of Confucian
thoughts as the ultimate source and beneficiary of moral cultivation. Instead, he understood the
love between parent and children to be intrinsic to human nature and reason, endowed by a divine
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source that seemed to represent the natural order more than a monotheistic deity. Obeying the
tendency to respect one’s parents and love one’s children is therefore following “le dessin du Ciel,”
while going against it leads to disgrace and misfortune not as a punishment from God, but as a
consequence of unnatural impulses. 98
Then, Bernier devoted two substantial sections of his “Introduction” to examining the
genius of filial piety in creating a stable and virtuous government. In rationalizing the political
utility of filial piety, Bernier reflected: “une famille nourrie & élevée dans cet esprit d’amour,
d’obéissance & soumission à l’égard des pères & des mères… serait fort dispose à se soumettre
doucement & sans contrainte aux Loix & aux Magistrats, & conséquemment à obéir volontiers
aux Ordres du Prince…” 99 This shows that the submission to laws and the state replaced the
reverence for God as the primary objective of cultivating filial piety. Bernier, believing that the
modeling of the family unit after the state was established since the days of the ancient Sage King,
concluded that China under Confucianism had attained a state of perfection in the ethics and
philosophy of governance since its conception. Thus, as a culmination to his utopic imagining of
Confucian China, Bernier effused: “Car il n’en est point de ceci comme de la République de Platon
qui n’a jamais été qu’en idée. Il est constant que ce grand Empire de la Chine a été plus de quatre
mille ans très bien gouverné sur ces principes qui peut-être ne vous paraîtront d’abord mériter
d’être mis entre les fondamentaux.”100 In short, China was the Platonic ideal manifested. Never
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mind that Confucianism did not encompass the entirety of Chinese intellectual tradition, nor was
it a timeless set of doctrines passed down and repeated by the descendants as truisms, as
demonstrated by the rich commentarial traditions among Confucian scholars that ceaselessly
reinterpreted the classical texts.
Bernier’s writing demonstrates the use of what Basil Guy terms as “the Chinese example”
in developing certain intellectual agenda for seventeenth-century Europe. His account of
Confucian political morality was rife with hyperbolic language and litanies of praises for the
unparalleled wisdom, piety, and virtue of the Chinese civilization. 101 The resulting product was a
China that was more a paradigm than a place, which supposedly possessed and thrived upon the
many attributes that Bernier hoped to see realized in France; for instance, a Prince who functions
as moral example for the people, the education of a virtuous citizenship since childhood, and a
mutually loving and beneficent relationship between the ruler and the subjects. 102 A key advantage
of leveraging the Chinese example, specifically through the focus on filial piety as a uniquely
Chinese virtue, was that it allowed Bernier to break away from Western intellectual traditions. He
did not have to turn towards Judeo-Christian scholars or Greco-Roman heritage for an answer to
the sociopolitical problems he perceived in Europe. 103 This expansion of intellectual horizon was
infinitely exciting for Bernier, as he mused to his reader: “Cette grande diversité qui est entre eux
& nous dans la manière de regarder les choses... excitera sans doute votre curiosité les examiner
avec attention. Que sait-on si nous ne nous tromperions point dans le jugement que nous en faisons,
& s'ils n'auraient point mieux rencontré que nous ?”104 Although Bernier’s China was largely a
Bernier, “Introduction,” 25.
Guy, 136.
103
Sylvie Taussig, "Introduction occidentale des classiques confucéens au XVIIe siècle,” in Confucius ou la science
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figment of his imagination, there seemed to be a genuine desire to learn from foreign intellectual
thoughts and apply them to Europe’s needs, as well as a questioning of the assumed superiority of
Western cultural heritage.
Bernier’s focus on the sociopolitical implications of Confucianism marked his
“Introduction” as a notable attempt to depart from the Jesuit-monopolized representation of China.
This secularizing the Chinese example reflected more broadly the approach of a critical stage of
transition for France. Additionally, Bernier’s moderate and compromising tone demonstrated his
attempt to establish some common ground between the religionnaires and the freethinkers, using
Confucianism as a channel to engage the public in Enlightenment-style dialogue. In the last section
of his “Introduction,” he acknowledged Régis’ review of CSP and commended the theologian’s
discerning take on the religious integrity of Confucianism. Specifically, Bernier brought up the
passage from Lunyu that Régis cited as an emblematic example for the connection between Ren
and Christian piety, and remarked: “Ce passage est admirable, & M. Régis a bien raison de dire
qu’au motif près aucun chrétien n’a jamais mieux parlé de la véritable charité qui regarde
généralement tous les hommes.”105 Bernier appeared to find a Christian reading of Confucianism
to be valuable, particularly in how it affirmed the universality of virtues such as charity among
humanity. Yet, his next sentence introduced a pivotal shift from Régis that suggested the
insufficiency of a theological treatment of Confucian ideals. “Mais je souhaiterais qu’il eût ajouté
cet autre petit passage du même philosophe,” Bernier proposed before quoting the following:
Je me souviens avec plaisir de ce soldat du royaume de Lu, qui avait perdu son
bouclier, & qui après l'avoir bien cherché sans le trouver, dit enfin pour se consoler:
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Un homme de Lu l'avait perdu ; un homme de Lu l'aura trouvé. Il aurait encore pu
mieux dire: “un homme l'aura trouvé.”106
This passage, despite a few variations in details, corresponds to an anecdote dating from the Spring
and Autumn Period (770 BC – 256 BC) in China. It was later adapted by Confucian scholars as a
part of the text, Kongzi Jiayu (孔子家语, Family Sayings of Confucius), which is a collection of
aphorisms that complement the study of Lunyu.107
If Régis’ choice of passage captured the universality of Christianity, then Bernier’s addition
elevated Confucianism into a proof for the universality of humanity, not just religious ideals, that
transcends national boundaries. Régis’ conclusion that “tant il est vrai que Dieu a répandu dans
l’esprit même des Infidèles des lumières qui les conduisent à des vertus” reinforced the trope of
the “virtuous pagans,” which alienated Confucian China while commending it. 108 Bernier, on the
other hand, seems to want to altogether discard the distinction between pagans and Christians.
Such a sentiment overshadows Bernier’s attachment to a Christianized reading of CSP and
preluded the emergence of Enlightenment universalism that would become an important yet
increasingly questioned aspect of Western intellectual heritage. Thus, Bernier’s “Introduction”
signifies a growing awareness of the secular potential of Confucianism. It reveals the malleability
of the Chinese example under European appropriation, as it evolves from its initial introduction to
France as a defense of Christian morality and edges towards the other end of the spectrum as a
means to criticize the failings of the religious institution and its oppressive influence. The next
figure explored in this chapter, Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), would complete the secularization, and
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thus the weaponization, of the Chinese example while setting the stage for the intellectual giants
of the French Enlightenment to engage Confucian ideals in expressing the anxieties and aspirations
of their epoch.

2.2 Pierre Bayle’s Atheist Interpretation of Confucianism
A Huguenot who fled to Netherlands after Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edicts of Nantes,
Pierre Bayle was perhaps the most emblematic freethinkers and one of the fiercest critics of
Catholic orthodoxy.109 Bayle founded the periodical Nouvelles de la Republique de Lettre in 1684,
where he reviewed and engaged with the writings of his contemporaries while broadcasting ideas
too heterodoxic to appear in Journal des Sçavants––a publication that was fundamentally French
and therefore conservative despite its prestige and its mission of encouraging intellectual
explorations.110 François Bernier was among the thinkers reviewed by Nouvelles. The positive
publicity that he enjoyed from Bayle’s good words established a foundation of friendship between
the two, as Bernier wrote in a letter to Bayle: “tout le monde m’en demande depuis ce que vous en
avez dit dans les Nouvelles de decembre… mais ils ne sçavent pas ce que je leur diray pour sauver
vostre honneur à mon egard, que vous estes du moins aussi bon amy que bon juge.”111
While the two may not be equally militant in their push for rationalism over orthodoxy,
Bernier and Bayle evidently shared similar opinions and interests. Among them was a fascination
for China and its philosophy. In April 1686, Bernier mentioned in a letter to Bayle about Couplet’s
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recent return from Rome. Expressing hope for what this visit might bring to the community of
savants, Bernier wrote: “Nous avons icy depuis 15 jours le R[everend] Père Couplet revenu de
Rome… nous esperons qu’ils nous donneront toutes les oeuvres de Confusius traduites, il y auroit
grand plaisir de voir ce que ces Messieurs de l’autre monde pensoient de leur costé sur la morale
à peu pres au mesme temps que Socrate y pensoit du sien.” 112 Bernier would not be disappointed,
for less than a year later Confucius Sinarum Philosophus appeared in Paris. Although Bayle’s
replies were lost, it is reasonable to assume that he was also eager to hear directly from the
renowned Chinese sage rather than through secondary reports such as travelogues and
ethnographies, and therefore most likely read CSP upon its publication. Though, as the prior
chapter established, the Confucius speaking to Bernier and Bayle was little more than a
construction of the Jesuits and the Chinese commentators they referenced.
As the following section will show, the revision of the Chinese example under Pierre Bayle
was as dramatic as it was ironic. A victim of King Louis’ religious prosecution, the very act that
Couplet used to crown the monarch as a paragon of Confucian virtues, Bayle turned CSP’s
religious agenda completely on its head, and his representation of China would go on to influence
the next generation of critics against orthodoxy. Rather than presenting Confucius as a natural
theologian that validated religion and reason, Bayle deemed him to be blind “in regards to the true
God and his Laws;”113 rather than seeing Confucian China as a reflection of the universality of
Christian ideals and their integral role in maintaining a virtuous society, Bayle argued that it was
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thoroughly atheist and the living proof that not only can a society function without religion, but it
can in fact be virtuous and prosperous.
Bayle had his eyes set on the heterodox potential of China several years before the
appearance of CSP. His view on China was heavily influenced by the French intellectual and a
leading Sceptic, La Mothe le Vayer (1588 - 1672), who argued for China’s atheism in his work La
vertu des payens (1642) and was seen as a chief precursor to Enlightenment Sinophilia and
cosmopolitanism.114 A fundamental disagreement between Bayle and a Christianized reading of
Confucianism was the relationship between reason and religion. The Jesuits, attempting to
reconcile Confucius’ paganism with the theological integrity of his philosophy, framed him as a
natural theologian who discovered and promoted Christian principles “by the light of nature and
reason alone.”115 Implicit in this argument was the idea that reason and religion complement one
another. It was only natural that a virtuous, albeit pagan, philosopher such as Confucius would
come upon Christian ideals. After all, they were inherent truths that transcend time and cultural
divides. Therefore, the Christian interpreters never really perceived reason as the enemy of faith,
though it was inconceivable that reason can stand alone without the guidance of faith. Pierre Bayle,
on the other hand, seemed to consider reason and religion, or at least religious orthodoxy, as the
antitheses of each other. 116 As he remarked sardonically in Réponse aux questions d’un provincial:
I fancy I gathered from some of you that, as regards the Trinity and some other
articles of the Christian faith, reason must bow to the word of God, but that, as
regards the Fall of Adam and its consequences, the Scriptures must defer to the
judgment of the philosophers. I should be sorry for you if you really took this view
and believed you could differentiate to that extend.117
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In other words, certain intellectuals’ fancy that they could balance their loyalty between religion
and logic would sooner or later confound them with paradoxes. Bayle was not championing an
atheist society, as he himself was a Protestant. Yet, he was calling for a deep introspection and a
questioning of the most fundamental social principles among his contemporaries––Catholics,
deists, and philosophers alike. For him, religious intolerance and violence was a prime example of
the absurdity allowed to happen in a society supposedly founded upon both reason and faith, and
it served as the catalyst for his advocacy of skepticism and fueled some of his most influential
works, such as Pensées diverses sur la Comète (1682) and Dictionnaire historique et
philosophique (1696). 118 This is where the presentation of China as an atheist society lends a
powerful hand to Bayle’s skeptic rhetoric.
In his writings, Bayle laid down the atheist nature of Confucianism as the very source of
its virtue. “Vous avez vu ci-dessus que la physique des philosophes chinois est un système
d’athéisme,” he proclaimed before quoting from a Jesuit writer’s praise of China, “à l’égard de la
morale ils paraissent beaucoup plus raisonnable… la fin que le sage (i.e. Confucius) se propose
est uniquement le bien public.” 119 Confucian atheism, Bayle expounded, was not a primitive
“negative atheism” practiced by certain civilizations he deemed as “backward,” but a highly
sophisticated “positive atheism” derived through natural reason.120 Notably, Bayle advocated that
the Confucian atheism approached the ideas of Spinoza (1632-1677), the notorious Dutch
philosopher regarded as the “prince of atheism” and one of the most abundantly cited authors in
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the radical Enlightenment discourse.121 Provided with this positive atheist model, Bayle repeatedly
leveraged Confucian China as the embodiment of reason to underline the failings of Christian
Europe. In his Commentaire Philosophique, for instance, Bayle imagined how the Confucian
scholar-officials would react to the competing Christian sects coming into their nation to win
converters. “Messieurs les convertisseurs Chrétiens…qui venez de si loin pour nous apprendre,
que vous n’étez pas d’accord entre vous,” the scholar-officials would thus address the missionaries,
before announcing that they would also like to hear from the sects who were not represented before
them before making a sound and informed judgement; but in the meantime, “vous ne gagnerez
aucun Chinois, pourvue que vous ne vous serviez que de la raison...”122
In this scenario, the scholar-officials’ impartiality and neutrality juxtaposed with the petty
squabbles among Christian sects. There was also the implication that the Confucian literati’s
dissociation of moral principles from religious zeal promoted rational discourse and the freedom
of expression under the Chinese government, which aligned with Bayle’s vision of republican
ideal.123 In short, Bayle believed that Confucianism provided China a set of moral codes based on
reason alone; and, unlike the critics of atheisms surmised, a society founded purely on reason had
not only remained functional for thousands of years, but it also fostered greater peace and tolerance
by avoiding the imposition of a universal religious conscience. Again, one perceives an image of
China that conveniently functioned as the physical manifestation of an ideal, or more accurately,
a thought experiment, proposed by a French thinker looking to enact some form of social
reconstitution within his society. This removed kingdom, with a philosophy that appeared rational

121

Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 161; Israel, Enlightenment Contested, 644; Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et
critique, IV, 271.
122
Pierre Bayle, Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jesus-Christ Contrain les d'entre. (Cantebury: Chez
Thomas Litwel, 1686). Translation: “Gentlemen Christian Converters…who come so far to inform us that you have
not agreed among yourselves… you can never win over one Chinese, unless you employ no other means than
Reason…”
123
Simon Kow, China in Early Enlightenment Political Thought, (New York: Routledge, 2017), 71-72.

Rachel Yang

57

and moral, yet ambiguous and inaccessible enough to invite appropriation, served as solid proof
that heterodoxic speculations can become reality. 124
Bayle’s objective in raising Confucian China as a paradigmatic atheist state was to
undermine the role of religion in dictating moral conscience, and thus, true to the epoch’s
freethinking spirit, challenge his contemporaries to adopt a similar attitude of Skepticism. 125 Basil
Guy has rightly pointed out the exploitative nature of Bayle’s treatment of the Chinese example:
Relativism, the separation of morality and religion, negating the validity of
miracles––all this, and more, Bayle drew from innumerable documents printed
before him, finding in China the perfect proof of his argument…We must in all
fairness note that especially where China was concerned, the facts Bayle used in
forging his experimental free-thinking were precisely those facts that were already
familiar and to the great linking of the general public, especially his observations
on Chinese customs. The great flowering of exotic literature in the seventeenth
century… is ample proof of public interest in these matters.126
There is no lack of similar theses by contemporary historians commenting on early modern
Europe’s distorting representations of Asia. The consensus was that most Sinophiles of Bayle’s
time were less interested in understanding the reality of China than what China could do for them.
While Guy and other scholars have convincingly undermined the façade of cosmopolitanism the
European savants proclaimed for themselves, it may not be sufficient as the only way to think
about Enlightenment’s role in the context of global history. I argue that it is time to look beyond
the fact of ideological appropriation itself, and instead focus on how such acts of appropriation
were a necessarily part of importing and repurposing foreign ideologies into a part of the
Enlightenment conversation as a more productive way of examining the role of non-European
cultures during the time.
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Notably, Bayle’s commentary on Chinese religious tolerance directly confronted the
general assumption of European moral and cultural superiority during the seventeenth century.
Raising the Chinese example in juxtaposition to the hypocrisy and foolishness of Christian
factionalism, Bayle wrote: “Je ne sais pas pourquoi les Chrétiens font si peu de réflexions sur
l’esprit de tolerance qui rène dans ces rois païens que nous traitons hautement de barbares et de
féroces.”127 François Bernier had professed a similar sentiment in his “Introduction,” albeit in a
much more amicable and moderate manner, in suggesting “que sait-on si nous ne nous tromperions
point dans le jugement que nous en faisons, & s'ils [les Chinois] n'auraient point mieux rencontré
que nous ?”128 As one can see, despite the rhetorical use of China in their writings, Bayle and
Bernier seemed to seriously weigh the value in reading Chinese sources and learn about how they
might benefit and inform the European public. Inevitably, the freethinkers’ attempts to define
Confucianism with terminologies such as “rationalism,” “atheism,” or “natural theology” were
anachronistic and misleading, rooted as they are in the Western intellectual framework. Yet, to
bridge the epistemological gap between China and the West, and therefore to situate and effect
Confucianism as a part of Enlightenment discourse, requires a level of appropriation that detaches
it from its application in seventeenth-century China and endows it with relevance in a new context.
Simon Kow raises an insightful question in his study on Bayle and China: “To what extent
can particular interpretations of China by Enlightenment thinkers be seen as attempts to reconcile
moral universalism and cultural diversity…even if they fall short of contemporary anti-colonial
and multicultural attitudes?”129 Kow concludes that, while Bayle did not actually consider atheism
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to be morally superior to having a religious conscience, he used Confucian China to defend the
moral integrity of atheism, and to argue that a tolerant atheist society is preferable to the religious
fanaticism that led to injustices such as the revocation of the Edicts of Nantes. 130 Again, there was
a tangible effort to reflect on and criticize the insufficiency of European institutions and to treat a
foreign social model as a legitimate and intellectually sound alternative. Although Bayle was not
concerned with representing Confucian China as authentically as possible––an impossible feat to
start with due to the spatial and linguistic inaccessibility of the source materials––his status as an
emblematic figure in this “Crisis of Conscience” and his heterodoxy’s inflammatory effects in the
following century allowed Bayle’s version of China to become a formidable player in Europe’s
intellectual arena.
Thanks to the labor of Pierre Bayle and his Skeptic agenda, the secularization of the
Chinese example becomes complete. The fact that thinkers as diametrically opposed as Couplet
and Bayle both appropriated Confucianism to vie for influence over public sentiment attests to not
only the interpretive potential of the philosophy, but also its full integration as a part of the
conversations building up to a transformative era of European history. Confucianism’s momentum
will continue and multiply into the eighteenth century, as monumental figures such as Voltaire and
Rousseau entered the picture and picked up where the Jesuits and the freethinkers left off.

2.3 Voltaire and Rousseau: China as a Vehicle of Discourse in the High Enlightenment
Pierre Bayle’s prolific attacks on religious orthodoxy has been dubbed as the “Arsenal of
Enlightenment” for how eighteenth-century French thinkers leveraged them to consummate the
demise of the ancien régime. 131 Naturally, China became a part of Bayle’s intellectual heritage to
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the philosophes. Voltaire, a name that has become synonymous with the French Enlightenment,
also happened to be the most vocal and influential Sinophile of his age.132 The fact that Confucius’
portrait hung on the library at Voltaire’s Ferney Château, where he lived from 1761 until his death
in 1778, attested to the extent of his idolization of the Chinese Sage. 133 The Chinese example was
also featured in some of Voltaire’s most emblematic works, such as Dictionnaire philosophique
(1752) and Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations (1756). Yet, the reaction towards this foreign
ideology was not one of unanimous admiration in France. Jean-Jacque Rousseau, the other
intellectual giant of the age and Voltaire’s ideological opponent on many fronts, was a prominent
critic of Confucian China for how it challenged his ideal of the “Noble Savage.”
This section follows Europe’s transition away from the “Crisis of Conscience” to fully
enter the High Enlightenment, and then examines how Confucianism’s ideological implication
was still potent enough to inspire both admiration and condemnation among the champions of
reason. I will use the writings of Voltaire and Rousseau, the two most illustrious philosophes of
the age whose contrasting ideological stance manifested in their reception of Confucianism, to
demonstrate the way in which the interpretation of Confucian ideals became a vehicle of
intellectual discourse that allow French thinkers to engage in debates and push forward their
personal ideological agenda. This signifies the full departure of Confucianism from its place of
origin, shedding the layers of cultural nuance it had accumulated over the centuries before adopting
the vocabulary of the Enlightenment, thus contributing to the global origin of the movement in
how it acted as a stimulus for critical conversations to take place. It is impossible to both adequately

On Voltaire and China, see: Guy 214-284; Arnold H. Rowbotham, “Voltaire, Sinophile,” PMLA 47, no. 4 (1932):
1050–65; Rowbotham, “The Impact of Confucianism,” 229-232; Davis, 541-545; David Morgan, “Sources of
Enlightenment: The Idealizing of China in Jesuits’ Lettres Edifiants and Voltaire’s ‘Siècle de Louis XIV,’ Romance
Notes, 37, no. 3 (1997), 263-272; Urs App, The Birth of Orientalism, (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press,
2010), 15-76; Van Kley, 372-4, 382-5; Clarke, 44-47; Lilti, 24-5.
133
Rowbotham, “Voltaire, Sinophile,” 1057.
132

Rachel Yang

61

and concisely capture Voltaire’s long record of Sinophilia and the countering force of Sinophobia
in the eighteenth century. As a result, I will focus on Rousseau’s essay, Discours sur les sciences
et les arts (1750) and Voltaire’s play, L’Orphelin de la Chine (1755) to examine the dialogic nature
of these two works concerning the ideological implications that Confucianism raised for
Enlightenment France.
A celebrated philosophe whose fame during his lifetime nearly matched his posthumous
legacy, Voltaire was a versatile writer with a corpus as diverse as his interests. He had produced
biting satires as social critiques, historical chronicles, popular plays, and rich philosophical
treatises. The foremost and most consistent agenda that Voltaire championed was the vehement
criticism of Christianity, especially the Catholic Church, for how it bred intolerance and
superstition in Europe, a phenomenon he referred to as l’Infâme (The Infamous). His interest in
China, frivolous and incidental in its nature, proved to be a valuable weapon in his crusade against
l'Infâme. 134 Voltaire’s acquaintance with Confucianism and his affinity for it trace back to his
education at the Jesuit school of Louis-le-Grand, where he was introduced from a young age to a
number of Jesuits’ sinological literature such as Lettres édifiantes et curieuse de la Chine and
Description de l’empire de la Chine by Father Jean-Baptiste Du Halde. Basil Guy also notes that
Voltaire “appears to have read the translations from the Chinese classics prepared by a little group
of Jesuits at Hangchow (Hangzhou) under Father Intoretta in the previous century.” 135 Such an
uncertainty suggests that Voltaire’s future Sinophilia was less a culmination of systematic
scholarly studies on Confucian texts––as was the case of translators such as Couplet, Foucher, and
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Bernier––than a fascination with the image of China embodied by a sage-like figure who held a
reservoir of wisdom that Voltaire might draw from according his needs.
Despite not having devoted tangible effort in analyzing Confucian texts, Voltaire was not
dissuaded from alluding to the image of the Chinese Sage in his discourse. Specifically, Confucian
China played an essential role in Voltaire’s preaching of the superiority of deism over religious
dogmas and the role of philosophers in political affairs. 136 The paramount status of China in
Voltaire’s philosophical endeavors was epitomized in Essai sur les moeurs, his magnum opus and
an admirable attempt to tackle a survey of world history, where China had the honor of opening
and closing this voluminous treatise. 137 The work opened with the following sentence: “L'empire
de la Chine dès lors était plus vaste que celui de Charlemagne … Son histoire, incontestable dans
les choses générales, la seule qui soit fondée sur des observations célestes, remonte, par la
chronologie la plus sûre, jusqu'à une éclipse observée deux mille cent cinquante-cinq ans avant
notre ère vulgaire.”138 Immediately, the Chinese chronology presented itself as a subject of fixation
for Voltaire. Leaving no room for doubt that the four-thousand years of history was accurate,
Voltaire set up the Chinese chronology to undermine the Judeo-Christian worldview. 139 This
attested to the central role that China assumed in Voltaire’s attempt to synthesize world history
and to reshape Europe’s understanding on subjects such as the origin of human civilization and
how to situate itself in context of other nations in the world.
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Subsequent mentions of Confucianism promoted the virtue of running a society based on
natural theology, or deism, where tolerance and rational philosophy reigned supreme. 140 In
introducing Confucius, Voltaire stressed his lack of divine revelation and how it did not
compromise the moral integrity of his teachings.141 Voltaire also rejected the accusation of atheism
that the enemies of Jesuits had laid upon China, criticizing the close-mindedness of his
contemporaries: “En imputant l'athéisme au gouvernement de ce vaste empire, nous avons eu la
légèreté de lui attribuer l'idolâtrie par une accusation qui se contredit ainsi elle-même. Le grand
malentendu sur les rites de la Chine est venu de ce que nous avons jugé de leurs usages par les
nôtres: car nous portons au bout du monde les préjugés de notre esprit contentieux.”142 Similar to
Bayle’s invocation of Confucian China, Voltaire used it to call out the self-absorbed ignorance of
those confined within the Christian worldview and urged Europe to recognize how it lagged behind
in terms of tolerance and inclusivity. In short, if Essai sur les mœurs signified a milestone in
Europe’s attempt to break out of its cultural and intellectual bubble and contextualize its history in
relation to the rest of the world, then Confucian China was an indispensable vehicle in the
emergence of Enlightenment universalism.
This great stride towards universalism, paradoxically, still held the interest and superiority
of Europe at heart. The following statement by Voltaire best illustrates the magnitude of this
Eurocentric ego: “Voilà l’histoire que tout homme sache… Tout nous regarde, tout est fait pour
nous…”143 In other words, Voltaire believed that the trajectory of world history culminated to this
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precise and fateful moment in the eighteenth century, when Europe was about to define the next
chapter of the narrative, and the other great civilizations had risen and fallen to fulfill Europe’s
undertaking as the maker of history. 144 If this was the sentiment lurking under Essai sur les mœurs,
would it effectively undermine Voltaire’s intention to acknowledge non-European cultures?
Antoine Lilti proposes that Voltaire’s interest in Eastern civilizations was sincere for how they
could be leveraged to dismantle the Judeo-Christian narrative of world history that greatly
contributed to the entrenchment of L’Infâme in Europe.145 Though China’s past glory played a
supporting role to Europe’s present greatness as the leading actor in history, the increased visibility
of its history and philosophy served to heighten Europe’s conscience for its ethical accountability
and promote moral and religious inclusivity by delegitimizing the Judeo-Christian worldview.
While Essai sur les moeurs falls into one of Voltaire’s more serious and philosophical
treatments of China, contemporary historians do not consider all his uses of the Chinese example
as possessing equal scholarly integrity. Basil Guy, for instance, maintains that all of Voltaire’s
invocations of China and Confucianism before Essai sur les mœurs were merely a reflection of
“chinoiseries” that “did nothing but accentuate his penchant for the more obvious and superficial
side of one of the many passing expressions of the Rococo.” 146 Evidently, Voltaire was far more a
Sinophile than a Sinologist, preferring to represent Confucian China according to the vaguely
defined image he derived from Jesuit literature rather than seeking out insights and nuances on his
own. But once we have made peace with the fact that Voltaire’s intellectual stakes remained firmly
grounded in eighteenth-century France despite his cosmopolitan aspirations, the next step is to
reconsider how Confucianism played a part in this gamble through a reconfiguration of its themes
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and constitution to address a new set of problems. Voltaire’s play L’Orphelin de la Chine (The
Orphan of China), written a year before the publication of Essai sur les mœurs and often regarded
as a prime example of sinomania in eighteenth-century France, will illustrate my argument that,
beyond creating an Orientalist sensation, the play also facilitated Enlightenment debate by serving
as Voltaire’s contestation against Rousseau’s Discours sur les sciences et les arts.
Before delving into Voltaire’s argument in L’Orphelin, it is necessary to first understand
the work and the writer that provoked it. Discours sur les sciences et les arts was the first major
expression of the Rousseau’s trademark polemic on the superiority of the State of Nature over the
corrupting influence of civilization. A vehement defamation of the arts and sciences for how they
exert a despotic and suffocating influence over people’s mind that slowly enslaves them, Discours
created explosive controversy among the European public that lasted for a decade. 147 Rousseau’s
indictment against civilization followed the stadial theory, an emerging historiographic approach
in the eighteenth century postulating that all human civilizations follow a general trajectory from
barbarism to progress to eventual downfall, though some experience faster growth while others
are more stagnant.148 For instance, some Enlightenment thinkers looked to the American Indians
as an example of primordial civilization, which could help Europe understand its undocumented
past before it reached a more mature stage. 149 In Discours, Rousseau surveyed the rise and fall of
numerous ancient European cities such as Athens, Rome, and Constantinople to make the point
that an excess of culture inevitably leads to moral deprivation and tragic demise. Then, in a rather
abrupt turn, Rousseau points an indicting finger towards the Chinese example. “Mais pourquoi
chercher dans des temps reculés,” Rousseau wrote, “des preuves d'une vérité dont nous avons sous
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nos yeux des témoignages subsistants.”150 The stadial theory maintains that global civilizations
share a common fate and may inform each other in their historical development. So, if Rousseau’s
readers believed references to antiquity were too elusive to ring the warning bell for the eighteenth
century, the recent history of China might do the trick, especially since its impression as a place
of unparalleled arts and culture governed by Confucian philosopher-kings had firmly taken root in
European minds.
To represent Confucian China as the epitome of civilization and, therefore, the victim of
all its vices, Rousseau pointed to the Mongol conquest of China in the thirteenth century that led
to the collapse of Song and the rise of Yuan. “Si les sciences puraient les mœurs, si elles
apprenaient aux hommes verser leur sang pour la patrie, si elles animaient le courage, les peuples
de la Chine devraient être sages, libres et invincibles,” Rousseau reasoned.151 But in face of the
morally uncultivated Mongols, the high culture of Confucianism did little good for the Chinese
people:
Mais s'il n'y a point de vice qui ne les domine, point de crime qui ne leur soit
familier ; si les lumières des ministres, ni la prétendue sagesse des lois, ni la
multitude des habitants de ce vaste empire n'ont pu le garantir du joug du Tartare
ignorant et grossier, de quoi lui ont servi tous ses savants ? Quel fruit a-t-il retiré
des honneurs dont ils sont comblés ? Serait-ce d'être peuplé d'esclaves et de
méchants ?152
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As one can see, Rousseau held an attitude of contempt and skepticism towards the praises his
contemporaries lavished on the Chinese sage. By pointing to an instance of dynastic transition,
historically perceived in China as consequence of widespread moral decline and the collapse of
social order, Rousseau shattered the consolidated image of China in the minds of Sinophiles as an
eternally peaceful and prosperous society under the governance of Confucian ideals, but rather, a
stagnant nation that progressed too far into the lifecycle of a civilization. For Rousseau, Confucian
China exemplified the superfluous and hollow nature of advanced civilizations proclaimed as
“virtuous” for their philosophy and sciences. This alluded to another heated topic of debate for the
philosophes, that is the rise of luxury, or le luxe, as a result of commerce. The admirers of social
progress such as Voltaire believed that industry and commerce promoted public welfare.
Rousseau’s Discours, however, played a decisive role in inciting passionate attack against le luxe
that outweighed its proponents in the mid-eighteenth century.153 It warned against the lethargy and
degeneration that excessive wealth can inflict upon a nation, a physical effect that came to be
known as mollesse. 154 China’s subjugation under the Mongols can therefore be seen as a
manifestation of mollesse, which filled China with “enslaved and wicked people” that allowed
barbarism to overtake civilization. No doubt having perceived his ideological opponents’
obsession with China, Rousseau integrated this Eastern civilization in a treatise that was otherwise
grounded in examining European cultural heritage to bolster his thesis.
If Rousseau saw his use of the Chinese example as a powerful rhetoric that responded to
the Orientalist vogue in France, then Voltaire decided to fight fire with fire. Five years after the
publication of Discours, L’Orphelin de la Chine premiered to the French public, in which Voltaire
gave his own version of the Mongol conquest of China that defended the virtue of civilization.
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Voltaire adapted his play from a Yuan dynasty (1271-1368) Chinese drama named The Orphan of
Zhao (Zhaoshi gu’er 赵氏孤儿) by Ji Junxiang (纪君祥, 13th century, precise dates unknown).
Translated into French and published in 1735 as a part of Father Du Hade’s Description de l’empire
de la chine, The Orphan of Zhao was the first Chinese drama to be exported into Europe and
greatly contributed to the development of intercultural theater during that time. 155 English
playwright William Hatchett first adapted the play in 1741 before it fell into Voltaire’s hands, and
two more English adaptations followed after Voltaire. In each version, The Orphan of Zhao
produced different polemics that voiced the political and intellectual concerns the authors
perceived in their respective contexts, illustrating the tendency among Enlightenment thinkers to
appropriate foreign materials and impose “universalist,” but in actuality Western, ideals onto them
as a way of conveying social criticism. 156
In order to see Voltaire’s creative decisions in adapting The Orphan of Zhao as a mode of
discourse that, specifically, controverted Rousseau’s ideas in Discours, a preliminary
understanding of the content and context of his Chinese source material is needed. The Orphan of
Zhao, premiered in thirteenth century China, dramatizes an event that took place during the Spring
and Autumn period (770-476 BCE). The premise is based on the massacre of the powerful Zhao
clan by its political rival, and follows the only surviving member of the family, the Orphan, after
he was adopted by the perpetrator of the murder and eventually uncovers his true heritage to avenge
his family. The revenge drama eulogizes a number of Confucian themes, such as righteousness (yi
义), filial duty, and the devotion to social hierarchy. Although the play is set in ancient China, the
author Ji Junxiang used the story to reflect the condition of his time, that being the thirteenth
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century China under Mongol rule. It has been noted that the play presents several parallels between
the tragedy of the Zhao clan and the last days of the Song dynasty, thus recalling the violence and
moral transgression that often accompany periods of dynastic transition and positioning itself as a
critique against the injustice and brutality of Mongol rule. 157
In Voltaire’s version of The Orphan of Zhao, the most influential adaptation of the play in
the West, the story’s connection to the Song-Yuan history becomes explicit. Rather than retaining
ancient China as a backdrop, the playwright transplanted the revenge story from the seventh
century BCE to the thirteenth century CE, and anachronistically featured Genghis Khan, the
Mongol ruler frequently associated with barbaric conquest, as the conqueror of China and the
antagonist/antihero figure of the play. Voltaire also heavily revised the structure and content of the
story to subject it to Western theatrical conventions and shifted its thematic focus from the triumph
of justice and Confucian virtues to the encounter between barbarism and civilization. Voltaire’s
preface to L’Orphelin revealed the writer’s ambivalent attitude towards the original Chinese play:
“L'Orphelin de Tchao est un monument précieux, qui sert plus faire connaître l'esprit de la Chine
que toutes les relations qu'on a faites, & qu'on fera jamais de ce vaste empire. Il est vrai que cette
pièce est toute barbare, en comparaison des bons ouvrages de nos jours ; mais aussi c'est un chefd’œuvre, si on le compare à nos pièces du quatorzième siècle.”158 On one hand, Voltaire believed
the Orphan of Zhao to exemplify the manners and virtues of Confucian China better than any
existing literature on the subject; on the other hand, its coarse structure––namely the lack of unity
in action, time, and place essential to early modern European playwriting––indicated the inferiority
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of Chinese theater compared to contemporary European standards. This not only justified the
considerable liberty he had taken in adapting the play, but also shed light on what exactly Voltaire
understood to be the essence of Confucian virtues based on what he presented as the moral lesson
of the story.
The moral lesson of L’Orphelin, in brief, was the triumph of civilization over barbarism,
respectively epitomized by Confucian China and Genghis Khan’s Mongol Empire. In Voltaire’s
story, while the Mongols were able to conquer China by force, their leader was touched by the
prevalence of virtue and reason that he observed across the nation and willingly submitted
himself to the rehabilitating light of civilization. An exchange between Genghis Khan and his
general Octar in Act IV, Scene 2 of the play illustrates a moment of profound introspection the
Mongol Emperor has undergone in face of the unbending loyalty and courage demonstrated by
the conquered Chinese people. Upon hearing about how the mandarin Zamti, designed by
Voltaire to be a paragon of Confucian virtue, refused to give up the Orphan of the Chinese
emperor despite torture, Genghis Khan sighed:
Je vois un peuple antique, industrieux, immense ;
Ses Rois sur la sagesse ont fondé leur puissance ;
De leurs voisins soumis heureux législateurs,
Gouvernant sans conquête, & régnant par les mœurs.
Le Ciel ne nous donna que la force en partage.
Nos arts sont les combats, détruire est notre ouvrage.
Ah ! de quoi m'ont servi tant de succès divers ?159
This passage reflected Voltaire and many other philosophes’ critique of war as the antithesis of
Enlightenment ideals, challenging its previous status as a mark of aristocratic virtues in France,
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instead deeming it as a manifestation of intolerance, irrationality, and religious zeal. 160 The
sentiment was aptly summarized by a contemporary of Voltaire, the French-German philosophe
Baron d’Holbach (1723-1789): “The glory associated with conquest, war and valor in almost all
countries is visibly a remnant of the savage customs that prevailed in all nations before they were
civilized…”161 Genghis Khan’s characterization of China strongly echoes virtues that eighteenthcentury Sinophiles commonly attributed to the nation, invoking the image of an eternal, peaceloving, and well-governed empire where the arts and letters nourished the people. The result of
this nourishment, according to Voltaire, was a spiritual and moral strength acquired through
civilization that could prevail over the brute force of the Mongols. Genghis Khan also lamented
the lack of such cultural refinement in his own people, who made conquest and destruction their
only art. Octar was amazed and confounded by the respect that his leader has developed for their
defeated enemies:
Pouvez-vous de ce peuple admirer la faiblesse ?
Quel mérite ont des arts, enfants de la mollesse,
Qui n'ont pu les sauver des fers & de la mort ?
Le faible est destiné pour servir le plus fort. 162
Octar’s response was unmistakably Rousseaunian. It recalled Discours’ polemic that arts and
culture soften the mind like poison, rendering a nation vulnerable against the onslaught of “iron
and death” that ultimately determines the winners and the losers. Moreover, it snidely commented
on the pro-war stance that Rousseau adopted in Discours by favoring military virtue over the
cultivation of moral through arts and philosophy, which contradicted Voltaire and other
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mainstream philosophes’ beliefs.163 L’Orphelin de la Chine, in dramatizing the history of Mongol
conquest that Rousseau cited as a case study for the failure of excessive culture, reversed the
narrative by showing how Confucian virtues persevered in a time of chaos and violence, ultimately
spreading Enlightenment to the Mongols by converting their leaders to the ways of Confucius. The
play ended with Genghis Khan adopting the Orphan and appointing Zamti as the “supreme
interpreter of the laws” to help promote “reason, justice, and customs” in his kingdom. 164 Hence,
the civilization of Rousseau’s “Noble Savage” constituted Voltaire’s happy ending for the story.
Basil Guy refers to L’Orphelin de la Chine as a culmination of “Voltaire’s early dabbling
in ‘chinoiseries.’”165 He points to Voltaire’s disregard for realism in terms of the play’s setting,
characters, and costumes as evidence for his exoticization of Chinese culture. Although Guy
recognizes L’Orphelin as Voltaire’s rebuttal to Rousseau’s argument in Discours, he primarily
sees the play as an instance of French Enlightenment’s failed attempt at representing foreign
cultures in its preoccupation with European sociopolitical concerns: “He [Voltaire] would always
pretend to study China as a philosophical representation, and as such, a weapon in his ideological
armoury.”166 Yet, there is something remarkable about the fact that the two monumental figures
the French Enlightenment clashed and proclaimed their ideals through the invocation of the
Chinese example, regardless of how far removed their representations were from the reality of
China and Confucianism in the thirteenth century.
Discours and L’Orphelin showcased how a foreign philosophy facilitated intellectual
discussion in eighteenth-century France, and how its recognition among Europeans amplified with
each instance of appropriation. Voltaire and Rousseau’s image of Confucian China and its various
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associations was the product of an almost century-long process of reinterpretation originating from
Jesuits’ sinological studies such as CSP, and then gradually repackaged and integrated into the
Enlightenment conversations through the works of theologians such as Régis and Foucher, and
then those of free-thinkers such as Bernier and Bayle. The first chapter established that CSP,
despite its propagandist undertone and its attempt to Christianize Confucianism, can stand as a
commentarial work with its own integrity that contributed to the multitude of interpretations for
Confucian classics. Then, the freethinkers’ and philosophes’ attempt to make Confucianism speak
to the political and moral issues of their time by fashioning it into a rhetorical weapon should also
be considered as a serious attempt at breaking out of Eurocentrism. This phenomenon allowed the
Chinese example to make substantial contribution to the development of the intellectual movement,
thus attesting to the global origin of the Enlightenment.
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CONCLUSION

The Enlightenment faded with the closing of the eighteenth century. What awaited Europe
in the nineteenth century would be another whirlwind of progress and transformation that was
complex in vastly different ways. If China and the Chinese Sage had a degree of privilege in the
time of Voltaire as the manifestations of virtue and sophistication, then that image eroded quickly
with changing ideological currents. The proliferation of race theory and the expansion of imperial
powers in Asia produced rhetoric that again and again solidified the alleged superiority of
European civilizations. The weakening of Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) and the Opium Wars (18391842) further shattered China’s aura as a great and powerful civilization that stood as an equal to
the West. Along with that, a new definition of modernity measured by progress and innovation
transformed China from an example of perfected civilization into a site of stagnation. 167
The most notorious nineteenth-century ethnography on China may be found in Essai sur
l’inégalité des races humaines (Essay on the inequality of human races, 1853) by the French writer
Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882). This Essai, in a peculiar parallel to Voltaire’s Essai sur les
mœurs, was Gobineau’s attempt at writing world history in a moment when Europe’s
understanding of its relationship with the rest of the world was vastly different than the century
before. In a chapter devoted to deciphering the cultures and customs of the Chinese race, Gobineau
expounded the stagnant nature of Chinese literature and governmental principles. 168 On the subject
of Confucianism, Gobineau dismissed it as nothing but “maximes usuelles...qui, par la manière
puérilement obscure et sèchement didactique dont elles sont exposées et déduites, ne constituent
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pas une branche de connaissance très digne d’admiration.”169 These damning judgements attested
to a complete reversal of opinion on the characteristics of a philosophy whose moral and political
doctrines made it an incarnation of the Platonic Republic to François Bernier writing in 1688.
Gobineau, though perhaps the most prominent, was far from an outlier in his opinion on China.
The truth is that the Chinese Sage had lost his charm over France in this new age, falling into
disgrace as his country became yet another subject of imperial conquest and a source of threat
manifested as the “Yellow Peril.”170 In short, this was the age when Saïd’s words resound with
absolute authority: “The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of
domination, or varying degrees of complex hegemony...”171
Yet, the seventeenth and eighteenth century presented a different story on the encounter
between Europe and Asia––one that has been overshadowed by Saïd's postcolonial narrative. My
study on the reception history of Confucianism in Enlightenment France is an attempt to bring this
story to light. The introduction of Confucianism to France in an age of globalization, and its
consequent appropriation by some of the most prominent thinkers of the age, transformed it into a
vehicle of intellectual discourse that contributed to, and even inspired, some of the most richly
debated topics during the Enlightenment. The Jesuits missionaries, who sketched out and
introduced the image of Confucian China to Europe, began this process of intellectual encounter
by presenting a Christianized reading of Confucian ideals in Confucius Sinarum Philosophus. The
translation, which was meant to promote the conversion mission and bolster the relevance of
religious conscience in a time of radical thinking, was subsequently subsumed by the freethinkers
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who recognized the interpretive potential of this imported philosophy. The freethinkers conjured
an idealized and flattened image of China as the epitome of reason, tolerance, and peace that could
be leveraged to address the European context, and in Pierre Bayle’s case, subvert religious
orthodoxy. The Chinese example, thus popularized and assimilated into the local intellectual
landscape, was inherited by the philosophes of the eighteenth century. Voltaire and Rousseau, the
two most recognizable names of the French Enlightenment, engaged in a debate on the virtues of
civilization versus the state of nature by invoking Confucian China.
This is a narrative that reframes the Enlightenment as a global phenomenon rather than a
legacy of European intellectual heritage. More specifically, the Enlightenment is global not only
because it provided the political and philosophical vocabulary that historical actors around the
world leveraged for their own ends, but because the Enlightenment itself was a product of crosscultural fertilization and appropriation of imported ideologies. The outpour of conversations that
came after the French public’s encounter with Confucianism attested to how a foreign philosophy
functioned as a source of intellectual stimulation, whether it presented as an appealing alternative
or a counterexample to European customs. This mode of engagement, though still rooted in
misrepresentation, subverts the Orientalist paradigm insisting that Europe’s encounter with Asia
can only take shape as exercises of power or cultural hegemony.
I have demonstrated how, under certain circumstances, acts of appropriation can be
intellectually productive within the local context. As the field of Global Enlightenment continues
to mature and gain recognition, this nuanced understanding of appropriation is crucial to
recalibrating Europe’s presumed centrality in the network of intellectual exchange in the modern
age and dismantle the West’s monopoly over Enlightenment heritage. The reception of
Confucianism in France is merely a singular case study that offers an intriguing glimpse into a
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much wider and more complex phenomenon, as the multiplicity of the Enlightenment continues
to come to light with each historiographical revision.

Coda
At the end of this study, let us return to the place of departure, that is, late imperial China,
before we followed Confucianism westbound. I have related the encounter between the
missionaries and the Chinese scholar-officials from the perspective of the Jesuits, who saw China
as, above all, a vast subject of conversion that could realize the Society’s spiritual and political
ambitions. In the process of ingratiating themselves with the local elites, the Jesuits succeeded in
converting some prominent members of the imperial court. Most notably, there was the Inspector
of imperial ministries Yang Tingyun (杨廷筠 1557– 1627), the Hangzhou official Li Zhizao (李
之藻 1565– 1630), and the first grand secretary Xu Guangqi (徐光启 1562– 1633), who collective
came to be known as the “Three Pillars of Early Christian Church” in China.172 Working closely
with Matteo Ricci, the Three Pillars played a foundational role in “harmonizing” Christianity with
Confucianism, attesting to active Chinese participation in this process of cultural exchange rather
than one-sided Jesuit interpretation.173
In his review of CSP, Pierre Régis had lauded the missionaries’ great “success” in affirming
Christian verities within Confucian thought, that the Chinese had received these verities with “faith”
and recognized them as moral principles that aligned with their own philosophy.174 This reveals a
Eurocentric narrative in which the West guided the virtuous but, nevertheless, paganistic Chinese
towards the light and truth of God. On the other hand, the group of converted elites held a vastly
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different understanding about this monumental meeting of the East and the West. For, just as the
reception of Confucianism in France demonstrated the influence of Eurocentric mentality in crosscultural encounters, Sinocentrism was rampant in a civilization equally prideful of its cultural
heritage and imperial power.
In his account of the Jesuit mission to China, Roger Hart examines the events using mostly
Chinese primary sources and uncovered a distinctly Sinocentric narrative. Hart points out that,
while the Jesuits saw their Chinese collaborators as converts who yielded to Christian teachings,
the collaborators saw the Jesuits as tribute-bearers from the West pledging their service to the
Emperor and brought along teachings could help strengthen the Middle Kingdom.175 Xu Guangqi,
the most influential ally of the Jesuits, leveraged Western religious, scientific, and philosophical
knowledge in a propagandistic manner to present solutions to various problems he perceived in
Ming Dynasty during a period of dynastic decline. 176 Consequently, these converted literati
consolidated European religion, philosophy, and scientific knowledge into the so-called Western
Learning (Xi xue 西学), which gave rise to the imagining of a paradigmatic West where there were
“no wars, rebellions, or changes in dynasties.”177
A fascinating parallel emerges from this meeting of the minds between China and Europe.
For the Chinese literati working with the Jesuits, their vision of the West was an “imagined
civilization” with a reservoir of knowledge and symbols that they could manipulate to promote
China’s welfare; whereas for the Jesuits, Confucian ideals produced the image of a “Chinese sage”
that they could leverage to defend religious orthodoxy. 178 Moreover, both sides adopted an
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ethnocentric position in perceiving this encounter, expressing admiration for the other while also
rejecting it as a true cultural equal. This reveals the early modern exchange between China and
Europe as a narrative of isolated encounters. It is a story of perspectives clashing together and
generating intellectual momentum in separate contexts, without necessarily converging into a truly
multicultural understanding. To bridge the history of Asia and Europe through a global
historiography, therefore, is not so much as to reconcile these narratives in search of progress
towards multiculturalism, as to uncover the lasting footprints these transnational encounters left
behind, which are too often submerged by the domination of ethnocentric historiography.
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